

Key Working Group Observations and Concerns

Working Group Observations

1. ***The main problems today are structural barriers to voting and administrative error.*** Mr. Perez observed that, in accordance with the research, the biggest issues today are structural barriers to voting, not stealing votes. Election administrators share this view. Election fraud is negligible, and to the extent it occurs, it needs to be prosecuted with stronger criminal laws. The biggest problem is properly preparing people, which is the responsibility of election administrators.
2. ***Most fraud and intimidation is happening outside of the polling place.*** Mr. Greenbaum observed that with respect to both voter fraud and voter suppression, such as deceptive practices and tearing up voter registration forms, most of that is taking place outside of the polling place.
3. ***This issue cannot be addressed through one study or one methodology alone.*** Mr. Weinberg observed that since there is such a variety in types of fraud and intimidation, one solution will not fit all. It will be impossible to obtain data or resolve any of these problems through a single method.
4. ***The preliminary research conducted for this project is extremely valuable.*** Several of the working group members complimented the quality of the research done and although it is only preliminary, thought it would be useful and informative in the immediate future.
5. ***The Department of Justice is exploring expanding its reach over voter suppression activities.*** In the context of the conversation about defining voter intimidation, Mr. Donsanto pointed out that while voter intimidation was strictly defined by the criminal law, his section is beginning to explore the slightly different concept of vote suppression, and how to pursue it. He mentioned the phone-jamming case in New Hampshire as an initial success in this effort. He noted that he believes that vote suppression in the form of deceptive practices ought to be a crime and the section is exploring ways to go after it within the existing statutory construct. Mr. Bauer raised the example of a party sending people dressed in paramilitary outfits to yell at people as they go to the polls, telling them they have to show identification. Mr. Donsanto said that under the laws he has to work with today, such activity is not considered corrupt. He said that his lawyers are trying to “bend” the current laws to address aggravated cases of vote suppression, and the phone-jamming case is an example of that. Mr. Donsanto said that within the Department, the term vote “suppression” and translating it into a crime is a “work in progress.”

6. ***Registration fraud does not translate into vote fraud.*** Ms. Rogers, Mr. Donsanto and others stated that although phony voter registration applications turned in by people being paid by the form was a problem, it has not been found in their experience to lead to fraudulent voters at the polls. Ms. Rogers said such people were motivated by money, not defrauding the election.
7. ***Handling of voter fraud and intimidation complaints varies widely across states and localities.*** Ms. Rogers and others observed that every state has its own process for intake and review of complaints of fraud and intimidation, and that procedures often vary within states. The amount of authority secretaries of state have to address such problems also is different in every state. Mr. Weinberg stated he believed that most secretaries of state did not have authority to do anything about these matters. Participants discussed whether secretaries ought to be given greater authority so as to centralize the process, as HAVA has mandated in other areas.

Working Group Concerns

1. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the purpose of the present project ought to be on assessing the level of fraud and where it is, rather than on developing methods for making such measurements. He believed that methodology should be the focus, “rather than opinions of interviewees.” He was concerned that the EAC would be in a position of “adding to the universe of opinions.”
2. Mr. Rokita questioned whether the “opinions” accumulated in the research “is a fair sampling of what’s out there.” Ms. Wang responded that one of the purposes of the research was to explore whether there is a method available to actually quantify in some way how much fraud there is and where it is occurring in the electoral process. Mr. Rokita replied that “Maybe at the end of the day we stop spending taxpayer money or it’s going to be too much to spend to find that kind of data. Otherwise, we will stop it here and recognize there is a huge difference of opinion on that issue of fraud, when it occurs is obtainable, and that would possibly be a conclusion of the EAC.” Ms. Sims responded that she thought it would be possible to get better statistics on fraud and there might be a way of “identifying at this point certain parts in the election process that are more vulnerable, that we should be addressing.”
3. Mr. Rokita stated that, “We’re not sure that fraud at the polling place doesn’t exist. We can’t conclude that.”
4. Mr. Rokita expressed concern about working with a political scientist. He believes that the “EAC needs to be very careful in who they select, because all the time and effort and money that’s been spent up to date and would be spent in the future could be invalidated by a wrong selection in the eyes of some group.”

NEXIS Charts

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Case Charts

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Appendix 1
List of Individuals Interviewed

Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite, Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley, ACLU Voting Rights Project

Nina Perales, Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Pat Rogers, attorney, New Mexico

Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobhere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson, Rice University

Tracey Campbell, author, *Deliver the Vote*

Douglas Webber, Assistant Attorney General, Indiana, (defendant in the Indiana voter identification litigation)

Heather Dawn Thompson, Director of Government Relations, National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky, Assistant General Counsel, American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette, Executive Director, American Center for Voting Rights

Joseph Rich, former Director of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Joseph Sandler, Counsel to the Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz, Executive Director, New York City Board of Elections

John Tanner, Director, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Wisconsin
Evelyn Stratton, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello, Executive Director, International Association of
Clerks, Records, Election Officials and Treasurers

Harry Van Sickle, Commissioner of Elections, Pennsylvania

Craig Donsanto, Director, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice

Sharon Priest, former Secretary of State, Arkansas

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Appendix 2
List of Literature Reviewed

Reports

People for the American Way and the NAACP, “The Long Shadow of Jim Crow,” December 6, 2004.

Laughlin McDonald, “The New Poll Tax,” *The American Prospect* vol. 13 no. 23, December 30, 2002.

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Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise, “Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?” A Report to the Center for Voting Rights & Protection, September, 2004.

Alec Ewald, “A Crazy Quilt of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law,” The Sentencing Project, November 2005.

American Center for Voting Rights “Vote Fraud, Intimidation and Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election,” August 2, 2005.

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The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald “Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General,” The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, December 2005.

Democratic National Committee, “Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio,” DNC Services Corporation, 2005

Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002."

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Craig Donsanto, "The Federal Crime of Election Fraud," Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice, prepared for Democracy.Ru, n.d., at http://www.democracy.ru/english/library/international/eng_1999-11.html

People for the American Way, Election Protection 2004, Election Protection Coalition, at <http://www.electionprotection2004.org/edaynews.htm>

Craig Donsanto, "Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United State Federal Law," *IFES Political Finance White Paper Series*, IFES, 2006.

General Accounting Office, "Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote," Report to Congressional Requesters, September 2005.

Lori Minnite and David Callahan, "Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud," Demos: A Network of Ideas and Action, 2003.

People for the American Way, NAACP, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, "Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections," December 2004.

Books

John Fund, *Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy*, Encounter Books, 2004.

Andrew Gumbel, *Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in American*, Nation Books, 2005.

Tracy Campbell, *Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005.

David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson, *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House: Foolhardiness, Folly, and Fraud in the Presidential Elections, from Andrew Jackson to George W. Bush*, Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004.

Mark Crispin Miller, *Fooled Again*, Basic Books, 2005.

Legal

Indiana Democratic Party vs. Rokita, U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana (Indianapolis) 1:05-cv-00634, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 06-2218

Common Cause of Georgia vs. Billups, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia (Rome) 4:05-cv-00201-HLM U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 05-15784

U.S. Department of Justice Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum (regarding HB 244), August 25, 2005 at
<http://www.votingrights.org/news/downloads/Section%205%20Recommendation%20Memorandum.pdf>

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Appendix 3
Excerpt from “Machinery of Democracy,” a Brennan Center Report

APPENDIX C

**BRENNAN CENTER TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY,
LAWRENCE NORDEN, CHAIR**

Excerpted from pp. 8-19

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force concluded, and the peer review team at NIST agreed, that the best approach for comprehensively evaluating voting system threats was to: (1) identify and categorize the potential threats against voting systems, (2) prioritize these threats based upon an agreed upon metric (which would tell us how difficult each threat is to accomplish from the attacker's point of view), and (3) determine, utilizing the same metric employed to prioritize threats, how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks would become after various sets of countermeasures are implemented.

This model allows us to identify the attacks we should be most concerned about (*i.e.*, the most practical and least difficult attacks). Furthermore, it allows us to quantify the potential effectiveness of various sets of countermeasures (*i.e.*, how difficult the least difficult attack is after the countermeasure has been implemented). Other potential models considered, but ultimately rejected by the Task Force, are detailed in Appendix B.

IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS

The first step in creating a threat model for voting systems was to identify as many potential attacks as possible. To that end, the Task Force, together with the participating election officials, spent several months identifying voting system vulnerabilities. Following this work, NIST held a Voting Systems Threat Analysis Workshop on October 7, 2005. Members of the public were invited to write up and post additional potential attacks. Taken together, this work produced over 120 potential attacks on the three voting systems. They are detailed in the catalogs annexed.²⁰ Many of the attacks are described in more detail at <http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers.htm>.

The types of threats detailed in the catalogs can be broken down into nine categories: (1) the insertion of corrupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2) wireless and other remote control attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3) attacks on tally servers; (4) miscalibration of voting machines; (5) shut off of voting machine features intended to assist voters; (6) denial of service attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or others at the polling place to affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; (9) attacks on ballots or VVPT. Often, the actual attacks

involve some combination of these categories. We provide a discussion of each type of attack in “Categories of Attacks,” *infra* at pp. 24–27.

PRIORITIZING THREATS: NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Without some form of prioritization, a compilation of the threats is of limited value. Only by prioritizing these various threats could we help election officials identify which attacks they should be most concerned about, and what steps could be taken to make such attacks as difficult as possible. As discussed below, we have determined the level of difficulty for each attack where the attacker is attempting to affect the outcome of a close statewide election.²¹

There is no perfect way to determine which attacks are the least difficult, because each attack requires a different mix of resources – well-placed insiders, money, programming skills, security expertise, *etc.* Different attackers would find certain resources easier to acquire than others. For example, election fraud committed by local election officials would always involve well-placed insiders and a thorough understanding of election procedures; at the same time, there is no reason to expect such officials to have highly skilled hackers or first-rate programmers working with them. By contrast, election fraud carried out by a foreign government would likely start with plenty of money and technically skilled attackers, but probably without many conveniently placed insiders or detailed knowledge of election procedures.

Ultimately, we decided to use the “number of informed participants” as the metric for determining attack difficulty. An attack which uses fewer participants is deemed the easier attack.

We have defined “informed participant” as someone whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows enough about the attack to foil or expose it. This is to be distinguished from a participant who unknowingly assists the attack by performing a task that is integral to the attack’s successful execution without understanding that the task is part of an attack on voting systems.

The reason for using the security metric “number of informed participants” is relatively straightforward: the larger a conspiracy is, the more difficult it would be to keep it secret. Where an attacker can carry out an attack by herself, she need only trust herself. On the other hand, a conspiracy that requires thousands of people to take part (like a vote-buying scheme) also requires thousands of people to keep quiet. The larger the number of people involved, the greater the likelihood that one of them (or one who was approached, but declined to take part) would either inform the public or authorities about the attack, or commit some kind of error that causes the attack to fail or become known.

Moreover, recruiting a large number of people who are willing to undermine the integrity of a statewide election is also presumably difficult. It is not hard to imagine two or three people agreeing to work to change the outcome of an election. It seems far less likely that an attacker could identify and employ hundreds or thousands of similarly corrupt people without being discovered.

We can get an idea of how this metric works by looking at one of the threats listed in our catalogs: the vote-buying threat, where an attacker or attackers pay individuals to vote for a particular candidate. This is Attack Number 26 in the PCOS Attack Catalog²² (though this attack would not be substantially different against DREs or DREs w/ VVPT).²³ In order to work under our current types of voting systems, this attack requires (1) at least one person to purchase votes, (2) many people to agree to sell their votes, and (3) some way for the purchaser to confirm that the voters she pays actually voted for the candidate she supported. Ultimately, we determined that, while practical in smaller contests, a vote-buying attack would be an exceptionally difficult way to affect the outcome of a statewide election. This is because, even in a typically close statewide election, an attacker would need to involve thousands of voters to ensure that she could affect the outcome of a statewide race.²⁴

For a discussion of other metrics we considered, but ultimately rejected, see Appendix C.

DETERMINING NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS

DETERMINING THE STEPS AND VALUES FOR EACH ATTACK

The Task Force members broke down each of the catalogued attacks into its necessary steps. For instance, Attack 12 in the PCOS Attack Catalog is “Stuffing Ballot Box with Additional Marked Ballots.”²⁵ We determined that, at a minimum, there were three component parts to this attack: (1) stealing or creating the ballots and then marking them, (2) scanning marked ballots through the PCOS scanners, probably before the polls opened, and (3) modifying the poll books in each location to ensure that the total number of votes in the ballot boxes was not greater than the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

Task Force members then assigned a value representing the minimum number of persons they believed would be necessary to accomplish each goal. For PCOS Attack 12, the following values were assigned:²⁶

Minimum number required to steal or create ballots: 5 persons total.²⁷

Minimum number required to scan marked ballots: 1 per polling place attacked.

Minimum number required to modify poll books: 1 per polling place attacked.²⁸

After these values were assigned, the Brennan Center interviewed several election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned to each attack.²⁹ When necessary, the values and steps were modified. The new catalogs, including attack steps and values, were then reviewed by Task Force members. The purpose of this review was to ensure, among other things, that the steps and values were sound.

These steps and values tell us how difficult it would be to accomplish a *single attack in a single polling place*. They do not tell us how many people it would take to change the outcome of an election successfully – that depends, of course, on specific facts about the jurisdiction: how many votes are generally recorded in each polling

place, how many polling places are there in the jurisdiction, and how close is the race? For this reason, we determined that it was necessary to construct a hypothetical jurisdiction, to which we now turn.

NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO CHANGE STATEWIDE ELECTION

We have decided to examine the difficulty of each attack in the context of changing the outcome of a reasonably close statewide election. While we are concerned by potential attacks on voting systems in any type of election, we are most troubled by attacks that have the potential to affect large numbers of votes. These are the attacks that could actually change the outcome of a statewide election with just a handful of attack participants.

We are less troubled by attacks on voting systems that can only affect a small number of votes (and might therefore be more useful in local elections). This is because there are many non-system attacks that can also affect a small number of votes (*i.e.*, sending out misleading information about polling places, physically intimidating voters, submitting multiple absentee ballots, *etc.*). Given the fact that these non-system attacks are likely to be less difficult in terms of number of participants, financial cost, risk of detection, and time commitment, we are uncertain that an attacker would target *voting machines* to alter a small number of votes.

In order to evaluate how difficult it would be for an attacker to change the outcome of a statewide election, we created a composite jurisdiction. The composite jurisdiction was created to be representative of a relatively close statewide election. We did not want to examine a statewide election where results were so skewed toward one candidate (for instance, the re-election of Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 2000, where he won 73% of the vote³⁰), that reversing the election results would be impossible without causing extreme public suspicion. Nor did we want to look at races where changing only a relative handful of votes (for instance, the Governor's race in Washington State in 2004, which was decided by a mere 129 votes³¹) could affect the outcome of an election; under this scenario, many of the potential attacks would involve few people, and therefore look equally difficult.

We have named our composite jurisdiction "the State of Pennasota." The State of Pennasota is a composite of ten states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin and Minnesota. These states were chosen because they were the ten "battleground" states that Zogby International consistently polled in the spring, summer, and fall 2004.³² These are statewide elections that an attacker would have expected, ahead of time, to be fairly close.

We have also created a composite election, which we label the "Governor's Race" in Pennasota. The results of this election are a composite of the actual results in the same ten states in the 2004 Presidential Election.

We have used these composites as the framework by which to evaluate the difficulty of the various catalogued attacks.³³ For instance, we know a ballot-box stuffing attack would require roughly five people to create and mark fake ballots, as

well as one person per polling place to stuff the boxes, and one person per polling place to modify the poll books. But, in order to determine how many informed participants would be needed to affect a statewide race, we need to know how many polling places would need to be attacked.

The composite jurisdiction and composite election provide us with information needed to answer these questions: *i.e.*, how many extra votes our attackers would need to add to their favored candidate's total for him to win, how many ballots our attackers can stuff into a particular polling place's ballot box without arousing suspicion (and related to this, how many votes are generally cast in the average polling place), how many polling places are there in the state, *etc.* We provide details about both the composite jurisdiction and election in the section entitled "Governor's Race, State of Pennasota, 2007," *infra* at pp 20–27.

LIMITS OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Of the possible metrics we considered, we believe that measuring the number of people who know they are involved in an attack (and thus could provide evidence of the attack to the authorities and/or the media), is the best single measure of attack difficulty; as already discussed, we have concluded that the more people an attacker is forced to involve in his attack, the more likely it is that one of the participants would reveal the attack's existence and foil the attack, perhaps sending attackers to jail. However, we are aware of a number of places where the methodology could provide us with questionable results.

By deciding to concentrate on size of attack team, we mostly ignore the need for other resources when planning an attack. Thus, a software attack on DREs which makes use of steganography³⁴ to hide attack instruction files (*see* "DRE w/ VVPT Attack No.1a", discussed in greater detail, *infra* at pp. 62–65) is considered easier than an attack program delivered over a wireless network at the polling place (*see* discussion of wireless networks, *infra* at pp. 85–91). However, the former attack probably requires a much more technologically sophisticated attacker.

Another imperfection with this metric is that we do not have an easy way to represent how much choice the attacker has in finding members of his attack team. Thus, with PCOS voting, we conclude that the cost of subverting a routine audit of ballots is roughly equal to the cost of intercepting ballot boxes in transit and substituting altered ballots (*see* discussion of PCOS attacks, *infra* at pp. 77–83). However, subverting the audit team requires getting a specific set of trusted people to cooperate with the attacker. By contrast, the attacker may be able to decide which precincts to tamper with based on which people he has already recruited for his attack.

In an attempt to address this concern, we considered looking at the number of "insiders" necessary to take part in each attack. Under this theory, getting five people to take part in a conspiracy to attack a voting system might not be particularly difficult. But getting five well-placed county election officials to take part in the attack would be (and should be labeled) the more difficult of the two attacks. Because, for the most part, the low-cost attacks we have identified do not necessarily involve well placed insiders (but could, for instance, involve one of many people with access to commercial off the shelf software ("COTS") during development

or at the vendor), we do not believe that using this metric would have substantially changed our analysis.³⁵

Finally, these attack team sizes do not always capture the logistical complexity of an attack. For example, an attack on VVPT machines involving tampering with the voting machine software and also replacing the paper records in transit requires the attacker to determine what votes were falsely produced by the voting machine and print replacement records in time to substitute them. While this is clearly possible, it raises a lot of operational difficulties – a single failed substitution leaves the possibility that the attack would be detected during the audit of ballots.

We have tried to keep these imperfections in mind when analyzing and discussing our least difficult attacks.

We suspect that much of the disagreement between voting officials and computer security experts in the last several years stems from a difference of opinion in prioritizing the difficulty of attacks. Election officials, with extensive experience in the logistics of handling tons of paper ballots, have little faith in paper and understand the kind of breakdowns in procedures that lead to traditional attacks like ballot box stuffing; in contrast, sophisticated attacks on computer voting systems appear very difficult to many of them. Computer security experts understand sophisticated attacks on computer systems, and recognize the availability of tools and expertise that makes these attacks practical to launch, but have no clear idea how they would manage the logistics of attacking a paper-based system. Looking at attack team size is one way to bridge this difference in perspective.

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURE SETS

The final step of our threat analysis is to measure the effect of certain countermeasures against the catalogued attacks. How much more difficult would the attacks become once the countermeasures are put into effect? How many more informed participants (if any) would be needed to counter or defeat these countermeasures?

Our process for examining the effectiveness of a countermeasure mirrors the process for determining the difficulty of an attack: we first asked whether the countermeasure would allow us to detect an attack with near certainty. If we agreed that the countermeasure would expose the attack, we identified the steps that would be necessary to circumvent or defeat the countermeasure. For each step to defeat the countermeasure, we determined the number of additional informed participants (if any) that an attacker would need to add to his team. As with the process for determining attack difficulty, the Brennan Center interviewed numerous election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned. When necessary, the values and steps for defeating the countermeasures were altered to reflect the input of election officials.

COUNTERMEASURES EXAMINED

BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The first set of countermeasures we looked at is the “Basic Set” of countermeasures. This Basic Set was derived from security survey responses³⁶ we received

from county election officials around the country, as well as additional interviews with more than a dozen current and former election officials. Within the Basic Set of countermeasures are the following procedures:

Inspection

The jurisdiction is not knowingly using any uncertified software that is subject to inspection by the Independent Testing Authority (often referred to as the “ITA”).³⁷

Physical Security for Machines

- Ballot boxes (to the extent they exist) are examined (to ensure they are empty) and locked by poll workers immediately before the polls are opened.
- Before and after being brought to the polls for Election Day, voting systems for each county are locked in a single room, in a county warehouse.
- The warehouse has perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards.
- Access to the warehouse is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.
- Some form of “tamper evident” seals are placed on machines before and after each election.
- The machines are transported to polling locations five to fifteen days before Election Day.

Chain of Custody/Physical Security of Election Day Records

- At close of the polls, vote tallies for each machine are totaled and compared with number of persons that have signed the poll books.
- A copy of totals for each machine is posted at each polling place on Election Night and taken home by poll workers to check against what is posted publicly at election headquarters, on the web, in the papers, or elsewhere.³⁸
- All audit information (*i.e.*, Event Logs, VVPT records, paper ballots, machine printouts of totals) that is not electronically transmitted as part of the unofficial upload to the central election office, is delivered in official, sealed and hand-delivered information packets or boxes. All seals are numbered and tamper-evident.
- Transportation of information packets is completed by two election officials representing opposing parties who have been instructed to remain in joint custody of the information packets or boxes from the moment it leaves the precinct to the moment it arrives at the county election center.

- Each polling place sends its information packets or boxes to the county election center separately, rather than having one truck or person pick up this data from multiple polling locations.
- Once the sealed information packets or boxes have reached the county election center, they are logged. Numbers on the seals are checked to ensure that they have not been replaced. Any broken or replaced seals are logged. Intact seals are left intact.
- After the packets and/or boxes have been logged, they are provided with physical security precautions at least as great as those listed for voting machines, above. Specifically, for Pennasota, we have assumed the room in which the packets are stored have perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards and county police officers; and access to the room is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.

Testing³⁹

- An Independent Testing Authority has certified the model of voting machine used in the polling place.
- Acceptance Testing⁴⁰ is performed on machines at time, or soon after they are received by County.
- Pre-election Logic and Accuracy⁴¹ testing is performed by the relevant election official.
- Prior to opening the polls, every voting machine and vote tabulation system is checked to see that it is still configured for the correct election, including the correct precinct, ballot style, and other applicable details.

REGIMEN FOR AUTOMATIC ROUTINE AUDIT PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES.

The second set of countermeasures is the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit Plus Basic Set of Countermeasures.

Some form of routine auditing of voter-verified paper records occurs in 12 states, to test the accuracy of electronic voting machines. They generally require between 1 and 10% of all precinct voting machines to be audited after each election. ⁴²

Jurisdictions can implement this set of countermeasures only if their voting systems produce some sort of voter-verified paper record of each vote. This could be in the form of a paper ballot, in the case of PCOS, or a voter-verified paper trail (“VVPT”), in the case of DREs.

We have assumed that jurisdictions take the following steps when conducting an Automatic Routine Audit (when referring to this set of assumptions “Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit”):

The Audit

- Leaders of the major parties in each county are responsible for selecting a sufficient number of audit-team members to be used in that county.⁴³
- Using a highly transparent random selection mechanism (*see* point ii, below), the voter-verified paper records for between a small percentage of all voting machines in the State are selected for auditing.
- Using a transparent random selection method, auditors are assigned to the selected machines (two or three people, with representatives of each major political party, would comprise each audit team).
- The selection of voting machines, and the assignment of auditors to machines, occurs immediately before the audits take place. The audits take place as soon after polls close as possible – for example, at 9 a.m. the morning after polls close.
- Using a transparent random selection method, county police officers, security personnel and the video monitor assigned to guard the voter-verified records are chosen from a large pool of on-duty officers and employees on election night.
- The auditors are provided the machine tallies and are able to see that the county tally reflects the sums of the machine tallies before the start of the inspection of the paper.
- The audit would include a tally of spoiled ballots (in the case of VVPT, the number of cancellations recorded), overvotes, and undervotes.

Transparent Random Selection Process

In this report, we have assumed that random auditing procedures are in place for both the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit and Regimen for Parallel Testing. We have further assumed procedures to prevent a single, corrupt person from being able to fix the results. This implies a kind of transparent and public random procedure.

For the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit there are at least two places where transparent, random selection processes are important: in the selection of precincts to audit, and in the assignment of auditors to the precincts they will be auditing.

Good election security can employ Transparent Random Selection in other places with good effect:

- the selection of parallel testers from a pool of qualified individuals.
- the assignment of police and other security professionals from on-duty lists, to monitor key materials, for example, the VVPT records between the time that they arrive at election central and the time of the completion of the ARA.

If a selection process for auditing is to be trustworthy and trusted, ideally:

- The whole process will be publicly observable or videotaped;⁴⁴
- The random selection will be publicly verifiable, *i.e.*, anyone observing will be able to verify that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number selected is not under the control of any small number of people); and
- The process will be simple and practical within the context of current election practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on election officials.

There are a number of ways that election officials can ensure some kind of transparent randomness. One way would be to use a state lottery machine to select precincts or polling places for auditing. We have included two potential examples of transparent random selection processes in Appendix F. These apply to the Regimen for Parallel Testing as well.

REGIMEN FOR PARALLEL TESTING PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The final set of countermeasures we have examined is “Parallel Testing” plus the Basic Set of countermeasures. Parallel Testing, also known as election-day testing, involves selecting voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible during the period that votes are being cast.

Parallel Testing

In developing our set of assumptions for Parallel Testing, we relied heavily upon interviews with Jocelyn Whitney, Project Manager for Parallel Testing in the State of California, and conclusions drawn from this Report.⁴⁵ In our analysis, we assume that the following procedures would be included in the Parallel Testing regimen (when referring to this regimen “Regimen for Parallel Testing”) that we evaluate:

- At least two of each DRE model (meaning both vendor and model) would be selected for Parallel Testing;
- At least two DREs from each of the three largest counties would be parallel tested;
- Counties to be parallel tested would be chosen by the Secretary of State in a transparent and random manner.
- Counties would be notified as late as possible that machines from one of their precincts would be selected for Parallel Testing;⁴⁶
- Precincts would be selected through a transparent random mechanism;
- A video camera would record testing;
- For each test, there would be one tester and one observer;

- Parallel Testing would occur at the polling place;
- The script for Parallel Testing would be generated in a way that mimics voter behavior and voting patterns for the polling place;
- At the end of the Parallel Testing, the tester and observer would reconcile vote totals in the script with vote totals reported on the machine.

Transparent Random Selection Process

We further assume that the same type of transparent random selection process that would be used for the Regimen for Automatic Routine Audit would also be employed for the Regimen for Parallel Testing to determine which machines would be subjected to testing on Election Day.

APPENDIX C

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY METRICS CONSIDERED

Dollars Spent

The decision to use the number of informed participants as the metric for attack level difficulty came after considering several other potential metrics. One of the first metrics we considered was the dollar cost of attacks. This metric makes sense when looking at attacks that seek financial gain – for instance, misappropriating corporate funds. It is not rational to spend \$100,000 on the misappropriation of corporate funds if the total value of those funds is \$90,000. Ultimately, we rejected this metric as the basis for our analysis because the dollar cost of the attacks we considered were dwarfed by both (1) current federal and state budgets, and (2) the amounts currently spent legally in state and federal political campaigns.

Time of Attack

The relative security of safes and other safety measures are often rated in terms of “time to defeat.” This was rejected as metric of difficulty because it did not seem relevant to voting systems. Attackers breaking into a house are concerned with the amount of time it might take to complete their robbery because the homeowners or police might show up. With regard to election fraud, many attackers may be willing to start months or years before an election if they believe they can control the outcome. As discussed *supra* at pp. 35–48, attackers may be confident that they can circumvent the independent testing authorities and other measures meant to identify attacks, so that the amount of time an attack takes becomes less relevant.

Appendix 4
Voting Fraud-Voter Intimidation Working Group

The Honorable Todd Rokita

Indiana Secretary of State

Member, EAC Standards Board and the Executive Board of the Standards Board

Kathy Rogers

Georgia Director of Elections, Office of the Secretary of State

Member, EAC Standards Board

J.R. Perez

Guadalupe County Elections Administrator, Texas

Barbara Arnwine

Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

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Barry Weinberg

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EAC Invited Technical Advisor:

Craig Donsanto

Director, Election Crimes Branch, U.S. Department of Justice

ⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R

ⁱⁱ The MyVote1 Project Final Report, Fels Institute of Government, University of Pennsylvania, November 1, 2005, Pg. 12

ⁱⁱⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R, p. 4. This same report criticizes some of the procedures the Section used for these systems and urged the Department to improve upon them in time for the 2004 presidential election. No follow-up report has been done since that time to the best of our knowledge.

^{iv} "Department Of Justice To Hold Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium," U.S. Department of Justice press release, August 2, 2005

^v Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United States Federal Law," IFES Political Finance White Paper Series, 2006, p. 29

^{vi} Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, Jr., Voting Rights Act Reauthorization: Research-Based Recommendations to Improve Voting Access, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2006, p. 29

DRAFT

Existing Research Analysis

There are many reports and books that describe anecdotes and draw broad conclusions from a large array of incidents. There is little research that is truly systematic or scientific. The most systematic look at fraud is the report written by Lori Minnite. The most systematic look at voter intimidation is the report by Laughlin McDonald. Books written about this subject seem to all have a political bias and a pre-existing agenda that makes them somewhat less valuable.

Researchers agree that measuring something like the incidence of fraud and intimidation in a scientifically legitimate way is extremely difficult from a methodological perspective and would require resources beyond the means of most social and political scientists. As a result, there is much more written on this topic by advocacy groups than social scientists. It is hoped that this gap will be filled in the "second phase" of this EAC project.

Moreover, reports and books make allegations but, perhaps by their nature, have little follow up. As a result, it is difficult to know when something has remained in the stage of being an allegation and gone no further, or progressed to the point of being investigated or prosecuted or in any other way proven to be valid by an independent, neutral entity. This is true, for example, with respect to allegations of voter intimidation by civil rights organizations, and, with respect to fraud, John Fund's frequently cited book. Again, this is something that it is hoped will be addressed in the "second phase" of this EAC project by doing follow up research on allegations made in reports, books and newspaper articles.

Other items of note:

- There is as much evidence, and as much concern, about structural forms of disenfranchisement as about intentional abuse of the system. These include felon disenfranchisement, poor maintenance of databases and identification requirements.
- There is tremendous disagreement about the extent to which polling place fraud, e.g. double voting, intentional felon voting, noncitizen voting, is a serious problem. On balance, more researchers find it to be less of a problem than is commonly described in the political debate, but some reports say it is a major problem, albeit hard to identify.
- There is substantial concern across the board about absentee balloting and the opportunity it presents for fraud.
- Federal law governing election fraud and intimidation is varied and complex and yet may nonetheless be insufficient or subject to too many limitations to be as effective as it might be.

- Deceptive practices, e.g. targeted flyers and phone calls providing misinformation, were a major problem in 2004.
- Voter intimidation continues to be focused on minority communities, although the American Center for Voting Rights uniquely alleges it is focused on Republicans.

Existing Literature Reviewed

Reports

The Long Shadow of Jim Crow, People for the American Way and the NAACP

The New Poll Tax, Laughlin McDonald

Wisconsin Audit Report, Voter Registration Elections Board

Preliminary Findings, Milwaukee Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud

Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, National Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter/Baker Report)

Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter/Baker Report), The Brennan Center and Professor Spencer Overton

Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or Both?, Chandler Davidson

A Crazy Quilt of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law, Alec Ewald

Vote Fraud, Intimidation and Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election, American Center for Voting Rights

America's Modern Poll Tax, The Advancement Project

Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General, The Brennan Center and Professor Michael McDonald

Democracy at Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio, Democratic National Committee

Department of Justice Public Integrity Reports 2002, 2003, 2004

Prosecution of Election Fraud under United States Federal Law, Craig Donsanto

Election Protection 2004, Election Protection Coalition

The Federal Crime of Election Fraud, Craig Donsanto

Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, General Accounting Office

Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud, Lori Minnite

Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections, People for the American Way, NAACP, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights

Books

Stealing Elections, John Fund

Steal this Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History of Democracy in American, Andrew Gumbel

Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition – 1742-2004, Tracey Campbell

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House, David E. Johnson and Jonny R. Johnson

Fooled Again, Mark Crispin Miller

Legal

Indiana Democratic Party vs. Rokita

Common Cause of Georgia vs. Billup

U.S. Department of Justice Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum (Georgia voter identification)

APPENDIX C

BRENNAN CENTER TASK FORCE ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY, LAWRENCE NORDEN, CHAIR

Excerpted from p.p. 8-19

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force concluded, and the peer review team at NIST agreed, that the best approach for comprehensively evaluating voting system threats was to: (1) identify and categorize the potential threats against voting systems, (2) prioritize these threats based upon an agreed upon metric (which would tell us how difficult each threat is to accomplish from the attacker's point of view), and (3) determine, utilizing the same metric employed to prioritize threats, how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks would become after various sets of countermeasures are implemented.

This model allows us to identify the attacks we should be most concerned about (*i.e.*, the most practical and least difficult attacks). Furthermore, it allows us to quantify the potential effectiveness of various sets of countermeasures (*i.e.*, how difficult the least difficult attack is after the countermeasure has been implemented). Other potential models considered, but ultimately rejected by the Task Force, are detailed in Appendix B.

IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS

The first step in creating a threat model for voting systems was to identify as many potential attacks as possible. To that end, the Task Force, together with the participating election officials, spent several months identifying voting system vulnerabilities. Following this work, NIST held a Voting Systems Threat Analysis Workshop on October 7, 2005. Members of the public were invited to write up and post additional potential attacks. Taken together, this work produced over 120 potential attacks on the three voting systems. They are detailed in the catalogs annexed.²⁰ Many of the attacks are described in more detail at <http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers.htm>.

The types of threats detailed in the catalogs can be broken down into nine categories: (1) the insertion of corrupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2) wireless and other remote control attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3) attacks on tally servers; (4) miscalibration of voting machines; (5) shut off of voting machine features intended to assist voters; (6) denial of service attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or others at the polling place to affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; (9) attacks on ballots or VVPT. Often, the actual attacks involve some combination of these categories. We provide a discussion of each type of attack in "Categories of Attacks," *infra* at pp. 24–27.

PRIORITIZING THREATS: NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Without some form of prioritization, a compilation of the threats is of limited value. Only by prioritizing these various threats could we help election officials identify which attacks they should be most concerned about, and what steps could be taken to make such attacks as difficult as possible. As discussed below, we have determined the level of difficulty for each attack where the attacker is attempting to affect the outcome of a close statewide election.²¹

There is no perfect way to determine which attacks are the least difficult, because each attack requires a different mix of resources – well-placed insiders, money, programming skills, security expertise, *etc.* Different attackers would find certain resources easier to acquire than others. For example, election fraud committed by local election officials would always involve well-placed insiders and a thorough understanding of election procedures; at the same time, there is no reason to expect such officials to have highly skilled hackers or first-rate programmers working with them. By contrast, election fraud carried out by a foreign government would likely start with plenty of money and technically skilled attackers, but probably without many conveniently placed insiders or detailed knowledge of election procedures.

Ultimately, we decided to use the “number of informed participants” as the metric for determining attack difficulty. An attack which uses fewer participants is deemed the easier attack.

We have defined “informed participant” as someone whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows enough about the attack to foil or expose it. This is to be distinguished from a participant who unknowingly assists the attack by performing a task that is integral to the attack’s successful execution without understanding that the task is part of an attack on voting systems.

The reason for using the security metric “number of informed participants” is relatively straightforward: the larger a conspiracy is, the more difficult it would be to keep it secret. Where an attacker can carry out an attack by herself, she need only trust herself. On the other hand, a conspiracy that requires thousands of people to take part (like a vote-buying scheme) also requires thousands of people to keep quiet. The larger the number of people involved, the greater the likelihood that one of them (or one who was approached, but declined to take part) would either inform the public or authorities about the attack, or commit some kind of error that causes the attack to fail or become known.

Moreover, recruiting a large number of people who are willing to undermine the integrity of a statewide election is also presumably difficult. It is not hard to imagine two or three people agreeing to work to change the outcome of an election. It seems far less likely that an attacker could identify and employ hundreds or thousands of similarly corrupt people without being discovered.

We can get an idea of how this metric works by looking at one of the threats listed in our catalogs: the vote-buying threat, where an attacker or attackers pay individuals to vote for a particular candidate. This is Attack Number 26 in the PCOS Attack Catalog²² (though this attack would not be substantially different against DREs or DREs w/ VVPT).²³ In order to work under our current types of voting

systems, this attack requires (1) at least one person to purchase votes, (2) many people to agree to sell their votes, and (3) some way for the purchaser to confirm that the voters she pays actually voted for the candidate she supported. Ultimately, we determined that, while practical in smaller contests, a vote-buying attack would be an exceptionally difficult way to affect the outcome of a statewide election. This is because, even in a typically close statewide election, an attacker would need to involve thousands of voters to ensure that she could affect the outcome of a statewide race.²⁴

For a discussion of other metrics we considered, but ultimately rejected, *see* Appendix C.

DETERMINING NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS

DETERMINING THE STEPS AND VALUES FOR EACH ATTACK

The Task Force members broke down each of the catalogued attacks into its necessary steps. For instance, Attack 12 in the PCOS Attack Catalog is “Stuffing Ballot Box with Additional Marked Ballots.”²⁵ We determined that, at a minimum, there were three component parts to this attack: (1) stealing or creating the ballots and then marking them, (2) scanning marked ballots through the PCOS scanners, probably before the polls opened, and (3) modifying the poll books in each location to ensure that the total number of votes in the ballot boxes was not greater than the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

Task Force members then assigned a value representing the minimum number of persons they believed would be necessary to accomplish each goal. For PCOS Attack 12, the following values were assigned:²⁶

Minimum number required to steal or create ballots: 5 persons total.²⁷

Minimum number required to scan marked ballots: 1 per polling place attacked.

Minimum number required to modify poll books: 1 per polling place attacked.²⁸

After these values were assigned, the Brennan Center interviewed several election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned to each attack.²⁹ When necessary, the values and steps were modified. The new catalogs, including attack steps and values, were then reviewed by Task Force members. The purpose of this review was to ensure, among other things, that the steps and values were sound.

These steps and values tell us how difficult it would be to accomplish a *single attack in a single polling place*. They do not tell us how many people it would take to change the outcome of an election successfully – that depends, of course, on specific facts about the jurisdiction: how many votes are generally recorded in each polling place, how many polling places are there in the jurisdiction, and how close is the race? For this reason, we determined that it was necessary to construct a hypothetical jurisdiction, to which we now turn.

NUMBER OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO CHANGE STATEWIDE ELECTION

We have decided to examine the difficulty of each attack in the context of changing the outcome of a reasonably close statewide election. While we are concerned by potential attacks on voting systems in any type of election, we are most troubled by attacks that have the potential to affect large numbers of votes. These are the attacks that could actually change the outcome of a statewide election with just a handful of attack participants.

We are less troubled by attacks on voting systems that can only affect a small number of votes (and might therefore be more useful in local elections). This is because there are many non-system attacks that can also affect a small number of votes (*i.e.*, sending out misleading information about polling places, physically intimidating voters, submitting multiple absentee ballots, *etc.*). Given the fact that these non-system attacks are likely to be less difficult in terms of number of participants, financial cost, risk of detection, and time commitment, we are uncertain that an attacker would target *voting machines* to alter a small number of votes.

In order to evaluate how difficult it would be for an attacker to change the outcome of a statewide election, we created a composite jurisdiction. The composite jurisdiction was created to be representative of a relatively close statewide election. We did not want to examine a statewide election where results were so skewed toward one candidate (for instance, the re-election of Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 2000, where he won 73% of the vote³⁰), that reversing the election results would be impossible without causing extreme public suspicion. Nor did we want to look at races where changing only a relative handful of votes (for instance, the Governor's race in Washington State in 2004, which was decided by a mere 129 votes³¹) could affect the outcome of an election; under this scenario, many of the potential attacks would involve few people, and therefore look equally difficult.

We have named our composite jurisdiction "the State of Pennasota." The State of Pennasota is a composite of ten states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin and Minnesota. These states were chosen because they were the ten "battleground" states that Zogby International consistently polled in the spring, summer, and fall 2004.³² These are statewide elections that an attacker would have expected, ahead of time, to be fairly close.

We have also created a composite election, which we label the "Governor's Race" in Pennasota. The results of this election are a composite of the actual results in the same ten states in the 2004 Presidential Election.

We have used these composites as the framework by which to evaluate the difficulty of the various catalogued attacks.³³ For instance, we know a ballot-box stuffing attack would require roughly five people to create and mark fake ballots, as well as one person per polling place to stuff the boxes, and one person per polling place to modify the poll books. But, in order to determine how many informed participants would be needed to affect a statewide race, we need to know how many polling places would need to be attacked.

The composite jurisdiction and composite election provide us with information needed to answer these questions: *i.e.*, how many extra votes our attackers would

need to add to their favored candidate's total for him to win, how many ballots our attackers can stuff into a particular polling place's ballot box without arousing suspicion (and related to this, how many votes are generally cast in the average polling place), how many polling places are there in the state, *etc.* We provide details about both the composite jurisdiction and election in the section entitled "Governor's Race, State of Pennasota, 2007," *infra* at pp 20–27.

LIMITS OF INFORMED PARTICIPANTS AS METRIC

Of the possible metrics we considered, we believe that measuring the number of people who know they are involved in an attack (and thus could provide evidence of the attack to the authorities and/or the media), is the best single measure of attack difficulty; as already discussed, we have concluded that the more people an attacker is forced to involve in his attack, the more likely it is that one of the participants would reveal the attack's existence and foil the attack, perhaps sending attackers to jail. However, we are aware of a number of places where the methodology could provide us with questionable results.

By deciding to concentrate on size of attack team, we mostly ignore the need for other resources when planning an attack. Thus, a software attack on DREs which makes use of steganography³⁴ to hide attack instruction files (*see* "DRE w/ VVPT Attack No. 1a", discussed in greater detail, *infra* at pp. 62–65) is considered easier than an attack program delivered over a wireless network at the polling place (*see* discussion of wireless networks, *infra* at pp. 85–91). However, the former attack probably requires a much more technologically sophisticated attacker.

Another imperfection with this metric is that we do not have an easy way to represent how much choice the attacker has in finding members of his attack team. Thus, with PCOS voting, we conclude that the cost of subverting a routine audit of ballots is roughly equal to the cost of intercepting ballot boxes in transit and substituting altered ballots (*see* discussion of PCOS attacks, *infra* at pp. 77–83). However, subverting the audit team requires getting a specific set of trusted people to cooperate with the attacker. By contrast, the attacker may be able to decide which precincts to tamper with based on which people he has already recruited for his attack.

In an attempt to address this concern, we considered looking at the number of "insiders" necessary to take part in each attack. Under this theory, getting five people to take part in a conspiracy to attack a voting system might not be particularly difficult. But getting five well-placed county election officials to take part in the attack would be (and should be labeled) the more difficult of the two attacks. Because, for the most part, the low-cost attacks we have identified do not necessarily involve well placed insiders (but could, for instance, involve one of many people with access to commercial off the shelf software ("COTS") during development or at the vendor), we do not believe that using this metric would have substantially changed our analysis.³⁵

Finally, these attack team sizes do not always capture the logistical complexity of an attack. For example, an attack on VVPT machines involving tampering with the voting machine software and also replacing the paper records in transit requires the attacker to determine what votes were falsely produced by the voting

machine and print replacement records in time to substitute them. While this is clearly possible, it raises a lot of operational difficulties – a single failed substitution leaves the possibility that the attack would be detected during the audit of ballots.

We have tried to keep these imperfections in mind when analyzing and discussing our least difficult attacks.

We suspect that much of the disagreement between voting officials and computer security experts in the last several years stems from a difference of opinion in prioritizing the difficulty of attacks. Election officials, with extensive experience in the logistics of handling tons of paper ballots, have little faith in paper and understand the kind of breakdowns in procedures that lead to traditional attacks like ballot box stuffing; in contrast, sophisticated attacks on computer voting systems appear very difficult to many of them. Computer security experts understand sophisticated attacks on computer systems, and recognize the availability of tools and expertise that makes these attacks practical to launch, but have no clear idea how they would manage the logistics of attacking a paper-based system. Looking at attack team size is one way to bridge this difference in perspective.

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURE SETS

The final step of our threat analysis is to measure the effect of certain countermeasures against the catalogued attacks. How much more difficult would the attacks become once the countermeasures are put into effect? How many more informed participants (if any) would be needed to counter or defeat these countermeasures? Our process for examining the effectiveness of a countermeasure mirrors the process for determining the difficulty of an attack: we first asked whether the countermeasure would allow us to detect an attack with near certainty. If we agreed that the countermeasure would expose the attack, we identified the steps that would be necessary to circumvent or defeat the countermeasure. For each step to defeat the countermeasure, we determined the number of additional informed participants (if any) that an attacker would need to add to his team. As with the process for determining attack difficulty, the Brennan Center interviewed numerous election officials to see whether they agreed with the steps and values assigned. When necessary, the values and steps for defeating the countermeasures were altered to reflect the input of election officials.

COUNTERMEASURES EXAMINED

BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The first set of countermeasures we looked at is the “Basic Set” of countermeasures. This Basic Set was derived from security survey responses³⁶ we received from county election officials around the country, as well as additional interviews with more than a dozen current and former election officials. Within the Basic Set of countermeasures are the following procedures:

Inspection

The jurisdiction is not knowingly using any uncertified software that is subject

to inspection by the Independent Testing Authority (often referred to as the "ITA").³⁷

Physical Security for Machines

Ballot boxes (to the extent they exist) are examined (to ensure they are empty) and locked by poll workers immediately before the polls are opened.

Before and after being brought to the polls for Election Day, voting systems for each county are locked in a single room, in a county warehouse.

The warehouse has perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards.

Access to the warehouse is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.

Some form of "tamper evident" seals are placed on machines before and after each election.

The machines are transported to polling locations five to fifteen days before Election Day.

Chain of Custody/Physical Security of Election Day Records

At close of the polls, vote tallies for each machine are totaled and compared with number of persons that have signed the poll books.

A copy of totals for each machine is posted at each polling place on Election Night and taken home by poll workers to check against what is posted publicly at election headquarters, on the web, in the papers, or elsewhere.³⁸

All audit information (*i.e.*, Event Logs, VVPT records, paper ballots, machine printouts of totals) that is not electronically transmitted as part of the unofficial upload to the central election office, is delivered in official, sealed and hand-delivered information packets or boxes. All seals are numbered and tamper-evident.

Transportation of information packets is completed by two election officials representing opposing parties who have been instructed to remain in joint custody of the information packets or boxes from the moment it leaves the precinct to the moment it arrives at the county election center.

Each polling place sends its information packets or boxes to the county election center separately, rather than having one truck or person pick up this data from multiple polling locations.

Once the sealed information packets or boxes have reached the county election center, they are logged. Numbers on the seals are checked to ensure that they have not been replaced. Any broken or replaced seals are logged. Intact seals are left intact.

After the packets and/or boxes have been logged, they are provided with physical security precautions at least as great as those listed for voting machines, above. Specifically, for Pennasota, we have assumed the room in which the packets are stored have perimeter alarms, secure locks, video surveillance and regular visits by security guards and county police officers; and access to the room is controlled by sign-in, possibly with card keys or similar automatic logging of entry and exit for regular staff.

Testing³⁹

An Independent Testing Authority has certified the model of voting machine used in the polling place.

Acceptance Testing⁴⁰ is performed on machines at time, or soon after they are received by County.

Pre-election Logic and Accuracy⁴¹ testing is performed by the relevant election official.

Prior to opening the polls, every voting machine and vote tabulation system is checked to see that it is still configured for the correct election, including the correct precinct, ballot style, and other applicable details.

REGIMEN FOR AUTOMATIC ROUTINE AUDIT PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES.

The second set of countermeasures is the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit Plus Basic Set of Countermeasures.

Some form of routine auditing of voter-verified paper records occurs in 12 states, to test the accuracy of electronic voting machines. They generally require between 1 and 10% of all precinct voting machines to be audited after each election. ⁴²

Jurisdictions can implement this set of countermeasures only if their voting systems produce some sort of voter-verified paper record of each vote. This could be in the form of a paper ballot, in the case of PCOS, or a voter-verified paper trail ("VVPT"), in the case of DREs.

We have assumed that jurisdictions take the following steps when conducting an Automatic Routine Audit (when referring to this set of assumptions "Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit"):

The Audit

Leaders of the major parties in each county are responsible for selecting a sufficient number of audit-team members to be used in that county.⁴³

Using a highly transparent random selection mechanism (*see* point ii, below), the voter-verified paper records for between a small percentage of all voting machines in the State are selected for auditing.

Using a transparent random selection method, auditors are assigned to the selected machines (two or three people, with representatives of each major

political party, would comprise each audit team).

The selection of voting machines, and the assignment of auditors to machines, occurs immediately before the audits take place. The audits take place as soon after polls close as possible – for example, at 9 a.m. the morning after polls close.

Using a transparent random selection method, county police officers, security personnel and the video monitor assigned to guard the voter-verified records are chosen from a large pool of on-duty officers and employees on election night.

The auditors are provided the machine tallies and are able to see that the county tally reflects the sums of the machine tallies before the start of the inspection of the paper.

The audit would include a tally of spoiled ballots (in the case of VVPT, the number of cancellations recorded), overvotes, and undervotes.

Transparent Random Selection Process

In this report, we have assumed that random auditing procedures are in place for both the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit and Regimen for Parallel Testing. We have further assumed procedures to prevent a single, corrupt person from being able to fix the results. This implies a kind of transparent and public random procedure.

For the Regimen for an Automatic Routine Audit there are at least two places where transparent, random selection processes are important: in the selection of precincts to audit, and in the assignment of auditors to the precincts they will be auditing.

Good election security can employ Transparent Random Selection in other places with good effect:

- the selection of parallel testers from a pool of qualified individuals.

- the assignment of police and other security professionals from on-duty lists, to monitor key materials, for example, the VVPT records between the time that they arrive at election central and the time of the completion of the ARA.

If a selection process for auditing is to be trustworthy and trusted, ideally:

- The whole process will be publicly observable or videotaped;⁴⁴

- The random selection will be publicly verifiable, *i.e.*, anyone observing will be able to verify that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number selected is not under the control of any small number of people); and

- The process will be simple and practical within the context of current election

practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burdens on election officials. There are a number of ways that election officials can ensure some kind of transparent randomness. One way would be to use a state lottery machine to select precincts or polling places for auditing. We have included two potential examples of transparent random selection processes in Appendix F. These apply to the Regimen for Parallel Testing as well.

REGIMEN FOR PARALLEL TESTING PLUS BASIC SET OF COUNTERMEASURES

The final set of countermeasures we have examined is “Parallel Testing” plus the Basic Set of countermeasures. Parallel Testing, also known as election-day testing, involves selecting voting machines at random and testing them as realistically as possible during the period that votes are being cast.

Parallel Testing

In developing our set of assumptions for Parallel Testing, we relied heavily upon interviews with Jocelyn Whitney, Project Manager for Parallel Testing in the State of California, and conclusions drawn from this Report.⁴⁵ In our analysis, we assume that the following procedures would be included in the Parallel Testing regimen (when referring to this regimen “Regimen for Parallel Testing”) that we evaluate:

At least two of each DRE model (meaning both vendor and model) would be selected for Parallel Testing;

At least two DREs from each of the three largest counties would be parallel tested;

Counties to be parallel tested would be chosen by the Secretary of State in a transparent and random manner.

Counties would be notified as late as possible that machines from one of their precincts would be selected for Parallel Testing;⁴⁶

Precincts would be selected through a transparent random mechanism;

A video camera would record testing;

For each test, there would be one tester and one observer;

Parallel Testing would occur at the polling place;

The script for Parallel Testing would be generated in a way that mimics voter behavior and voting patterns for the polling place;

At the end of the Parallel Testing, the tester and observer would reconcile vote totals in the script with vote totals reported on the machine.

Transparent Random Selection Process

We further assume that the same type of transparent random selection process that would be used for the Regimen for Automatic Routine Audit would also be employed for the Regimen for Parallel Testing to determine which machines would be subjected to testing on Election Day.

APPENDIX C

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY METRICS CONSIDERED

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The decision to use the number of informed participants as the metric for attack level difficulty came after considering several other potential metrics. One of the first metrics we considered was the dollar cost of attacks. This metric makes sense when looking at attacks that seek financial gain – for instance, misappropriating corporate funds. It is not rational to spend \$100,000 on the misappropriation of corporate funds if the total value of those funds is \$90,000. Ultimately, we rejected this metric as the basis for our analysis because the dollar cost of the attacks we considered were dwarfed by both (1) current federal and state budgets, and (2) the amounts currently spent legally in state and federal political campaigns.

Time of Attack

The relative security of safes and other safety measures are often rated in terms of “time to defeat.” This was rejected as metric of difficulty because it did not seem relevant to voting systems. Attackers breaking into a house are concerned with the amount of time it might take to complete their robbery because the homeowners or police might show up. With regard to election fraud, many attackers may be willing to start months or years before an election if they believe they can control the outcome. As discussed *supra* at pp. 35–48, attackers may be confident that they can circumvent the independent testing authorities and other measures meant to identify attacks, so that the amount of time an attack takes becomes less relevant.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER EAC ACTIVITY ON VOTER FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

- Time and resource constraints prevented the consultants from interviewing the full range of participants in the process. As a result, we recommend that any future activity in this area include conducting further interviews.

In particular, we recommend that more election officials from all levels of government, parts of the country, and parties be interviewed. These individuals have the most direct inside information on how the system works -- and at times does not work. They are often the first people voters go to when something goes wrong and are often responsible for fixing it. They are the ones who must carry out the measures that are designed to both prevent fraud and voter intimidation and suppression. They will most likely know what, therefore, is and is not working.

It would also be especially beneficial to talk to people in law enforcement, specifically federal District Election Officers ("DEOs") and local district attorneys, as well as civil and criminal defense attorneys.

The Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys appoint Assistant U.S. Attorneys to serve as DEOs for two years. DEOs are required to

- screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation;
- oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts;
- coordinate their district's (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors;
- coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters;
- issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and
- supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day.ⁱ

Given the great responsibilities of the DEOs, and the breadth of issues they must deal with, they undoubtedly are great resources for information and insight as to what types of fraud and intimidation/suppression are occurring in their districts.

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**Deliberative Process
Privilege**

In many situations, however, it is the local district attorneys who will investigate election fraud and suppression tactics, especially in local elections. They will be able to provide information on what has gone on in their jurisdictions, as well as which matters get pursued and why.

Finally, those who defend people accused of election related crimes would also be useful to speak to. They may have a different perspective on how well the system is working to detect, prevent, and prosecute election fraud.

- The Nexis search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by both consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. However, without being able to go beyond the agreed search terms, it could not be determined whether there was any later determination regarding the allegations, investigation or charges brought. This leaves a gaping hole: it is impossible to know if the article is just reporting on “talk” or what turns out to be a serious affront to the system.

As a result, we recommend that follow up Nexis research be conducted to determine what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case. This would provide a much more accurate picture of what types of activities are actually taking place.

- Similarly, many allegations are made in the reports and books that we analyzed and summarized. Those allegations are often not substantiated in any way and are inherently time limited by the date of the writing. Despite this, such reports and books are frequently cited by various interested parties as evidence of fraud or intimidation.

Therefore, we recommend follow up to the literature review: for those reports and books that make or cite specific instances of fraud or intimidation, a research effort should be made to follow up on those references to see if and how they were resolved.

- During the 2004 election and the statewide elections of 2005, the University of Pennsylvania led a consortium of groups and researchers in conducting the MyVote1 Project. This project involved using a 1-800 voter hotline where voters could call for poll location, be transferred to a local hotline, or leave a recorded message with a complaint. In 2004, this resulted in over 200,000 calls received and over 56,000 recorded complaints.ⁱⁱ The researchers in charge of this project have done a great deal of work to parse and analyze the data collected through this process, including going through the audio messages and categorizing them by the nature of the complaint. These categories include registration, absentee

ballot, poll access, ballot/screen, coercion/intimidation, identification, mechanical, provisional (ballot).

We recommend that further research include making full use of this data with the cooperation of the project leaders. While perhaps not a fully scientific survey given the self-selection of the callers, the information regarding 200,000 complaints should provide a good deal of insight into the problems voters experienced, especially those in the nature of intimidation or suppression.

- Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has a variety in ways it tracks complaints of voter intimidation,ⁱⁱⁱ the Section was extremely reluctant to provide the consultants with useful information. Further attempts should be made to obtain relevant data. This includes the telephone logs of complaints the Section keeps and information from the database – the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system – the Section maintains on complaints received and the corresponding action taken. We also recommend that further research include a review and analysis of the observer and monitor field reports from Election Day that must be filed with the Section.
- Similarly, the consultants believe it would be useful for any further research to include a review of the reports that must be filed by every District Election Officer to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As noted above, the DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports back to the Department would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or made confidential.
- The consultants also believe it would be useful for any further activity in this area to include attendance at the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium. According to the Department,^{iv}

Prosecutors serving as District Election Officers in the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices are required to attend annual training conferences on fighting election fraud and voting rights abuses... These conferences are sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, and feature presentations by Civil Rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. As a result of these conferences, there is a nationwide increase in Department expertise relating to the prosecution of election crimes and the enforcement of voting rights.

By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following:

- How District Election Officers are trained, e.g. what they are taught to focus their resources on, how they are instructed to respond to various types of complaints
- How information about previous election and voting issues is presented
- How the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants
- Included in this report is a summary of various methodologies political scientists and others suggested to measure voter fraud and intimidation. While we note the skepticism of the Working Group in this regard, we nonetheless recommend that in order to further the mission of providing unbiased data, further activity in this area include an academic institution and/or individual that focuses on sound, statistical methods for political science research.
- Finally, consultant Tova Wang recommends that future researchers review federal law to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threat .

According to Craig Donsanto, long-time director of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice,

As with other statutes addressing voter intimidation, in the absence of any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is the Criminal Division's position that section 1973gg-10(1) applies only to intimidation which is accomplished through the use of threats of physical or economic duress. Voter "intimidation" accomplished through less drastic means may present violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b), which are enforced by the Civil Rights Division through noncriminal remedies.^v

Mr. Donsanto reiterated these points to us on several occasions, including at the working group meeting.

As a result, researchers should examine if there is some way in which current law might be revised or new laws passed that would reach voter intimidation that does not threaten the voter physically or financially, but rather threatens the voter's right to vote as a tangible value in itself. Such an amendment or law would reach all forms of voter intimidation, no matter if it is motivated by race, party, ethnicity or any other criteria. The law would then *potentially* cover, for example, letters and postcards with language meant to deter voters from voting and both pre-election and Election Day challengers that are clearly mounting challenges solely on illegitimate bases.

In the alternative to finding a way to criminalize such behavior, researchers might examine ways to invigorate measures to deter and punish voter intimidation under the civil law. For example, there might be a private right of action created for

voters or groups who have been subjected to intimidation tactics in the voting process. Such an action could be brought against individual offenders; any state or local actor where there is a pattern of repeated abuse in the jurisdiction that such officials did not take sufficient action against; and organizations that intentionally engage in intimidating practices. As a penalty upon finding liability, civil damages could be available plus perhaps attorney's fees.

Another, more modest measure would be, as has been suggested by Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley,^{vi} to bring parity to fines for violations under the Voting Rights Act. Currently the penalty for fraud is \$10,000 while the penalty for acts to deprive the right to vote is \$5,000.

ⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R

ⁱⁱ The MyVote1 Project Final Report, Fels Institute of Government, University of Pennsylvania, November 1, 2005, Pg. 12

ⁱⁱⁱ Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities, General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R, p. 4. This same report criticizes some of the procedures the Section used for these systems and urged the Department to improve upon them in time for the 2004 presidential election. No follow-up report has been done since that time to the best of our knowledge.

^{iv} "Department Of Justice To Hold Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium," U.S. Department of Justice press release, August 2, 2005

^v Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United States Federal Law," IFES Political Finance White Paper Series, 2006, p. 29

^{vi} Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, Jr., Voting Rights Act Reauthorization: Research-Based Recommendations to Improve Voting Access, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2006, p. 29

Interviews

Common Themes

- There is virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem, with vote buying and registration fraud coming in after that. The vote buying often comes in the form of payment for absentee ballots, although not always. Some absentee ballot fraud is part of an organized effort; some is by individuals, who sometimes are not even aware that what they are doing is illegal. Voter registration fraud seems to take the form of people signing up with false names. Registration fraud seems to be most common where people doing the registration were paid by the signature.
- There is widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place fraud, or at least much less than is claimed, including voter impersonation, “dead” voters, noncitizen voting and felon voters. Those few who believe it occurs often enough to be a concern say that it is impossible to show the extent to which it happens, but do point to instances in the press of such incidents. Most people believe that false registration forms have not resulted in polling place fraud, although it may create the perception that vote fraud is possible. Those who believe there is more polling place fraud than reported/investigated/prosecuted believe that registration fraud does lead to fraudulent votes. Jason Torchinsky from the American Center for Voting Rights is the only interviewee who believes that polling place fraud is widespread and among the most significant problems in the system.
- Abuse of challenger laws and abusive challengers seem to be the biggest intimidation/suppression concerns, and many of those interviewed assert that the new identification requirements are the modern version of voter intimidation and suppression. However there is evidence of some continued outright intimidation and suppression, especially in some Native American communities. A number of people also raise the problem of poll workers engaging in harassment of minority voters. Other activities commonly raised were the issue of polling places being moved at the last moment, unequal distribution of voting machines, videotaping of voters at the polls, and targeted misinformation campaigns.
- Several people indicate – including representatives from DOJ -- that for various reasons, the Department of Justice is bringing fewer voter intimidation and suppression cases now and is focusing on matters such as noncitizen voting, double voting and felon voting. While the civil rights section continues to focus on systemic patterns of malfeasance, the public integrity section is focusing now on individuals, on isolated instances of fraud.
- The problem of badly kept voter registration lists, with both ineligible voters remaining on the rolls and eligible voters being taken off, remains a common concern. A few people are also troubled by voters being on registration lists in two states. They said that there was no evidence that this had led to double voting, but it opens the door to the possibility. There is great hope that full implementation of the new requirements of HAVA – done well, a major caveat – will reduce this problem dramatically.

Common Recommendations:

- Many of those interviewed recommend better poll worker training as the best way to improve the process; a few also recommended longer voting times or voting on days other than election day (such as weekends) but fewer polling places so only the best poll workers would be employed
- Many interviewed support stronger criminal laws and increased enforcement of existing laws with respect to both fraud and intimidation. Advocates from across the spectrum expressed frustration with the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue complaints.
 - With respect to the civil rights section, John Tanner indicated that fewer cases are being brought because fewer are warranted – it has become increasingly difficult to know when allegations of intimidation and suppression are credible since it depends on one’s definition of intimidation, and because both parties are doing it. Moreover prior enforcement of the laws has now changed the entire landscape – race based problems are rare now. Although challenges based on race and unequal implementation of identification rules would be actionable, Mr. Tanner was unaware of such situations actually occurring and the section has not pursued any such cases.
 - Craig Donsanto of the public integrity section says that while the number of election fraud related complaints have not gone up since 2002, nor has the proportion of legitimate to illegitimate claims of fraud, the number of cases the department is investigating and the number of indictments the section is pursuing are both up dramatically. Since 2002, the department has brought more cases against alien voters, felon voters and double voters than ever before. Mr. Donsanto would like more resources so it can do more and would like to have laws that make it easier for the federal government to assume jurisdiction over voter fraud cases.
- A couple of interviewees recommend a new law that would make it easier to criminally prosecute people for intimidation even when there is not racial animus.
- Almost everyone hopes that administrators will maximize the potential of statewide voter registration databases to prevent fraud. Of particular note, Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of Elections for Kentucky, emphasized that having had an effective statewide voter registration database for more than thirty years has helped that state avoid most of the fraud problems that have been alleged elsewhere, such as double voting and felon voting.
- Several advocate expanded monitoring of the polls, including some associated with the Department of Justice.
- Challenge laws, both with respect to pre-election day challenges and challengers at the polls, need to be revised by all states to ensure they are not used for purposes of wrongful disenfranchisement and harassment
- Several people advocate passage of Senator Barak Obama’s “deceptive practices” bill

- There is a split on whether it would be helpful to have nonpartisan election officials – some indicated they thought even if elections officials are elected nonpartisanly they will carry out their duties in biased ways nonetheless. However, most agree that elections officials pursuing partisan agendas is a problem that must be addressed in some fashion. Suggestions included moving election responsibilities out of the secretary of states' office; increasing transparency in the process; and enacting conflict of interest rules.
- A few recommend returning to allowing use of absentee ballots “for cause” only if it were politically feasible.
- A few recommend enacting a national identification card, including Pat Rogers, an attorney in New Mexico, and Jason Torchinsky from ACVR, who advocates the scheme contemplated in the Carter-Baker Commission Report.
- A couple of interviewees indicated the need for clear standards for the distribution of voting machines

Defining Election Fraud

Note: The definition provided below is for the purposes of this EAC project. Most of the acts described come within the federal criminal definition of fraud, but some may not.

Election fraud is any intentional action, or intentional failure to act when there is a duty to do so, that corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on election outcomes. This includes interfering in the process by which persons register to vote; the way in which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; and the process by which election results are canvassed and certified.

Examples include the following:

- falsifying voter registration information pertinent to eligibility to cast a vote, (e.g. residence, criminal status, etc).;
- altering completed voter registration applications by entering false information;
- knowingly destroying completed voter registration applications (other than spoiled applications) before they can be submitted to the proper election authority;
- knowingly removing eligible voters from voter registration lists, in violation of HAVA, NVRA, or state election laws;
- intentional destruction by election officials of voter registration records or balloting records, in violation of records retention laws, to remove evidence of election fraud;
- vote buying;
- voting in the name of another;
- voting more than once;
- coercing a voter's choice on an absentee ballot;
- using a false name and/or signature on an absentee ballot;
- destroying or misappropriating an absentee ballot;
- felons, or in some states ex-felons, who vote when they know they are ineligible to do so;
- misleading an ex-felon about his or her right to vote;
- voting by non-citizens who know they are ineligible to do so;
- intimidating practices aimed at vote suppression or deterrence, including the abuse of challenge laws;
- deceiving voters with false information (e.g.; deliberately directing voters to the wrong polling place or providing false information on polling hours and dates);

- knowingly failing to accept voter registration applications, to provide ballots, or to accept and count voted ballots in accordance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act;
- intentional miscounting of ballots by election officials;
- intentional misrepresentation of vote tallies by election officials;
- acting in any other manner with the intention of suppressing voter registration or voting, or interfering with vote counting and the certification of the vote.

Voting fraud does not include mistakes made in the course of voter registration, balloting, or tabulating ballots and certifying results. For purposes of the EAC study, it also does not include violations of campaign finance laws.

List of Experts Interviewed

Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference for Civil Rights

Wendy Weiser, Deputy Director, Democracy Program, The Brennan Center

William Groth, attorney for the plaintiffs in the Indiana voter identification litigation

Lori Minnite, Barnard College, Columbia University

Neil Bradley, ACLU Voting Rights Project

Nina Perales, Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

Pat Rogers, attorney, New Mexico

Rebecca Vigil-Giron, Secretary of State, New Mexico

Sarah Ball Johnson, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Kentucky

Stephen Ansolobhere, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Chandler Davidson, Rice University

Tracey Campbell, author, *Deliver the Vote*

Douglas Webber, Assistant Attorney General, Indiana, (defendant in the Indiana voter identification litigation)

Heather Dawn Thompson, Director of Government Relations, National Congress of American Indians

Jason Torchinsky, Assistant General Counsel, American Center for Voting Rights

Robin DeJarnette, Executive Director, American Center for Voting Rights

Joseph Rich, former Director of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Joseph Sandler, Counsel to the Democratic National Committee

John Ravitz, Executive Director, New York City Board of Elections

John Tanner, Director, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Kevin Kennedy, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections, Wisconsin

Evelyn Stratton, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio

Tony Sirvello, Executive Director, International Association of
Clerks, Records, Election Officials and Treasurers

Harry Van Sickle, Commissioner of Elections, Pennsylvania

Craig Donsanto, Director, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice

Sharon Priest, former Secretary of State, Arkansas

Nexis Search Articles Analysis

Absentee Ballots

According to press reports, absentee ballots are abused in a variety of ways:

1. Campaign workers, candidates and others coerce the voting choices of vulnerable populations, usually elderly voters
2. Workers for groups and individuals have attempted to vote absentee in the names of the deceased
3. Workers for groups, campaign workers and individuals have attempted to forge the names of other voters on absentee ballot requests and absentee ballots and thus vote multiple times

It is unclear how often actual convictions result from these activities (a handful of articles indicate convictions and guilty pleas), but this is an area in which there have been a substantial number of official investigations and actual charges filed, according to news reports where such information is available. A few of the allegations became part of civil court proceedings contesting the outcome of the election.

While absentee fraud allegations turn up throughout the country, a few states have had several such cases. Especially of note are Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, and most particularly, Texas. Interestingly, there were no articles regarding Oregon, where the entire system is vote by mail.

Voter Registration Fraud

According to press reports, the following types of allegations of voter registration fraud are most common:

1. Registering in the name of dead people
2. Fake names and other information on voter registration forms
3. Illegitimate addresses used on voter registration forms
4. Voters being tricked into registering for a particular party under false pretenses
5. Destruction of voter registration forms depending on the party the voter registered with

There was only one self evident instance of a noncitizen registering to vote. Many of the instances reported on included official investigations and charges filed, but few actual convictions, at least from the news reporting. There have been multiple reports of registration fraud in California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.

Voter Intimidation and Suppression

This is the area which had the most articles in part because there were so many allegations of intimidation and suppression during the 2004 election. Most of these remained allegations and no criminal investigation or prosecution ensued. Some of the cases did end up in civil litigation.

This is not to say that these alleged activities were confined to 2004 – there were several allegations made during every year studied. Most notable were the high number of allegations of voter intimidation and harassment reported during the 2003 Philadelphia mayoral race.

A very high number of the articles were about the issue of challenges to voters' registration status and challengers at the polling places. There were many allegations that planned challenge activities were targeted at minority communities. Some of the challenges were concentrated in immigrant communities.

However, the tactics alleged varied greatly. The types of activities discussed also include the following:

- Photographing or videotaping voters coming out of polling places.
- Improper demands for identification
- Poll watchers harassing voters
- Poll workers being hostile to or aggressively challenging voters
- Disproportionate police presence
- Poll watchers wearing clothes with messages that seemed intended to intimidate
- Insufficient voting machines and unmanageably long lines

Although the incidents reported on occurred everywhere, not surprisingly, many came from “battleground” states. There were several such reports out of Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

“Dead Voters and Multiple Voting”

There were a high number of articles about people voting in the names of the dead and voting more than once. Many of these articles were marked by allegations of big numbers of people committing these frauds, and relatively few of these allegations turning out to be accurate according to investigations by the newspapers themselves, elections officials and criminal investigators. Often the problem turned out to be a result of administrative error, poll workers mis-marking of voter lists, a flawed registration list and/or errors made in the attempt to match names of voters on the list with the names of the people who voted. In a good number of cases, there were allegations that charges of double voting by political leaders were an effort to scare people away from the voting process.

Nonetheless there were a few cases of people actually being charged and/or convicted for these kinds of activities. Most of the cases involved a person voting both by absentee ballot and in person. A few instances involved people voting both during early voting

and on Election Day, which calls into question the proper marking and maintenance of the voting lists. In many instances, the person charged claimed not to have voted twice on purpose. A very small handful of cases involved a voter voting in more than one county and there was one substantiated case involving a person voting in more than one state. Other instances in which such efforts were alleged were disproved by officials.

In the case of voting in the name of a dead person, the problem lay in the voter registration list not being properly maintained, i.e. the person was still on the registration list as eligible to vote, and a person taking criminal advantage of that. In total, the San Francisco Chronicle found 5 such cases in March 2004; the AP cited a newspaper analysis of five such persons in an Indiana primary in May 2004; and a senate committee found two people to have voted in the names of the dead in 2005.

As usual, there were a disproportionate number of such articles coming out of Florida. Notably, there were three articles out of Oregon, which has one hundred percent vote-by-mail.

Vote Buying

There were a surprising number of articles about vote buying cases. A few of these instances involved long-time investigations in three particular jurisdictions as detailed in the vote buying summary. There were more official investigations, indictments and convictions/pleas in this area. All of these cases are concentrated in the Midwest and South.

Deceptive Practices

In 2004 there were numerous reports of intentional disinformation about voting eligibility and the voting process meant to confuse voters about their rights and when and where to vote. Misinformation came in the form of flyers, phone calls, letters, and even people going door to door. Many of the efforts were reportedly targeted at minority communities. A disproportionate number of them came from key battleground states, particularly Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. From the news reports found, only one of these instances was officially investigated, the case in Oregon involving the destruction of voter registration forms. There were no reports of prosecutions or any other legal proceeding.

Non-citizen Voting

There were surprisingly few articles regarding noncitizen registration and voting – just seven all together, in seven different states across the country. They were also evenly split between allegations of noncitizens registering and noncitizens voting. In one case charges were filed against ten individuals. In one case a judge in a civil suit found there was illegal noncitizen voting. Three instances prompted official investigations. Two cases, from this nexis search, remained just allegations of noncitizen voting.

Felon Voting

Although there were only thirteen cases of felon voting, some of them involved large numbers of voters. Most notably, of course, are the cases that came to light in the Washington gubernatorial election contest (see Washington summary) and in Wisconsin (see Wisconsin summary). In several states, the main problem has the large number of ineligible felons that remained on the voting list.

Election Official Fraud

In most of the cases in which fraud by elections officials is suspected or alleged, it is difficult to determine whether it is incompetence or a crime. There are several cases of ballots gone missing, ballots unaccounted for and ballots ending up in a worker's possession. In two cases workers were said to have changed peoples' votes. The one instance in which widespread ballot box stuffing by elections workers was alleged was in Washington State. The judge in the civil trial of that election contest did not find that elections workers had committed fraud. Four of the cases are from Texas.

Working Group Recommendations

1. **Use the 2006 and/or 2008 elections as a laboratory by employing observers.**

At the working group meeting, there was much discussion about using observers to collect data regarding fraud and intimidation at the polls in the upcoming elections. Mr. Ginsberg recommended using representatives of both parties for the task. Mr. Bauer and others objected to this, believing that using partisans as observers would be unworkable and would not be credible to the public.

There was even greater concern about the difficulties in getting access to poll sites for the purposes of observation. Most states strictly limit who can be in the polling place. In addition, there are already so many groups doing observation and monitoring at the polls, administrators might object. There was further concern that observers would introduce a variable into the process that would impact the outcome. The very fact that observers were present would influence behavior and skew the results.

Moreover, it was pointed out, many of the problems we see now with respect to fraud and intimidation does not take place at the polling place, e.g. absentee ballot fraud and deceptive practices. Poll site monitoring would not capture this activity. Moreover, with increased use of early voting, poll site monitoring might have to go on for weeks to be effective, which would require tremendous resources.

Mr. Weinberg suggested using observers in the way they are utilized in international elections. Such observers come into a jurisdiction prior to the election, and use standardized forms at the polling sites to collect data.

2. **Do a study on absentee ballot fraud.** The working group agreed that since absentee ballot fraud is the main form of fraud occurring, and is a practice that is great expanding throughout the country, it would make sense to do a stand-alone study of absentee ballot fraud. Such a study would be facilitated by the fact that there already is a great deal of information on how, when, where and why such practices are carried out based on cases successfully prosecuted. Researchers could look at actual cases to see how absentee ballot fraud schemes are conducted in an effort to provide recommendations on more effective measures for preventing them.

3. **Use risk analysis methodology to study fraud.**¹ Working group members were supportive of one of the methodologies recommended for studying this issue, risk analysis. As Mr. Bauer put it, based on the assumption that people act rationally, do an examination of what types of fraud people are most likely to commit, given the relative costs and benefits. In that way, researchers can rank the types of fraud that are the easiest to commit at the least cost with the greatest effect, from

¹ See Appendix C, and section on methodology

most to least likely to occur. This might prove a more practical way of measuring the problems than trying to actually get a number of acts of fraud and/or intimidation occurring. Mr. Greenbaum added that one would want to examine what conditions surrounding an election would be most likely to lead to an increase in fraud. Mr. Rokita objected based on his belief that the passions of partisanship lead people to not act rationally in an election.

4. **Conduct research using a methodology of database comparison.** Picking up on a suggestion made by Spencer Overton and explained in the suggested methodology section, Mr. Hearne recommended studying the issue using statistical database matching. Researchers should compare the voter roll and the list of people who actually voted to see if there are “dead” and felon voters. Because of the inconsistent quality of the databases, however, a political scientist would need to work in an appropriate margin of error when using such a methodology.
5. **Conduct a study of deceptive practices.** The working group discussed the increasing use of deceptive practices, such as flyers with false and/or intimidating information, to suppress voter participation. A number of groups, including the Department of Justice, the EAC, and organizations such as the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, keep phone logs regarding complaints of such practices, which may be available for review and analysis. This is also an area in which there is often tangible evidence, such as copies of the flyers and postcards themselves. All of this information should be reviewed and analyzed to see how such practices are being conducted and what can be done about them.
6. **Study use of HAVA’s administrative complaint procedure to see if it can be used to measure some forms of fraud and intimidation.** The EAC should study the extent to which states are actually utilizing the administrative complaint procedure mandated by HAVA. In addition, the EAC should study whether data collected through the administrative complaint procedure can be used as another source of information for measuring fraud and intimidation.
7. **Examine the use of special election courts.** Given that many state and local judges are elected, it may be worth exploring whether special election courts that are running before, during and after election day would be an effective means of disposing with complaints and violations in an expeditious manner. Pennsylvania employs such a system, and the EAC should consider investigating how well it is working to deal with fraud and intimidation problems.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER EAC ACTIVITY ON VOTER FRAUD AND INTIMIDATION

Consultant Recommendations

- **Greatly expand the scope of individuals interviewed.** Time and resource constraints prevented the consultants from interviewing the full range of participants in the electoral process. As a result, we recommend that in the next phase of this project, further interviews be conducted. In particular, a greater sampling of state and local election officials from different parts of the country should be interviewed. These individuals have first hand information and experience in the operation of elections.

We also recommend that in the next phase interviews be conducted with people in law enforcement, specifically Federal District Election Officers (“DEOs”)¹ and local district attorneys and attorneys defending those accused of election crimes or civil violations. In many instances it is the local district attorney who will investigate election fraud and suppression complaints. Attorneys who defend people accused of election crimes will have a different perspective on how the system is working to detect, prevent, and prosecute election fraud.

- **Conduct Follow-Up Nexis Research.** The Nexis search conducted for this phase of the research was based on a list of search terms agreed upon by both consultants. Thousands of articles were reviewed and hundreds analyzed. Many of the articles contain allegations of fraud or intimidation. Similarly, many of the articles contain information about investigations into such activities or even charges brought. However, without being able to go beyond the search terms, we

¹ The Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has all of the 93 U.S. Attorneys appoint Assistant U.S. Attorneys to serve as DEOs for two years. DEOs are required to screen and conduct preliminary investigations of complaints, in conjunction with the FBI and PIN, to determine whether they constitute potential election crimes and should become matters for investigation; oversee the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and other election crimes in their districts; coordinate their district’s (investigative and prosecutorial) efforts with DOJ headquarters prosecutors; coordinate election matters with state and local election and law enforcement officials and make them aware of their availability to assist with election-related matters; issue press releases to the public announcing the names and telephone numbers of DOJ and FBI officials to contact on election day with complaints about voting or election irregularities and answer telephones on election day to receive these complaints; and supervise a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys and FBI special agents who are appointed to handle election-related allegations while the polls are open on election day. *Department of Justice’s Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities*: General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R

could not determine whether there was any action taken regarding the allegations, investigation or charges brought. Consequently, it is impossible to know if the article is just reporting on “talk” or what turns out to be a serious affront to the system. We recommend that follow up Nexis research be conducted to establish what, if any, resolutions or further activity there was in each case.

We also believe that in the second phase of this project, there should be a sampling of local newspapers from around the country to analyze for articles on voter fraud and voter intimidation. This will lead to a better idea of problems that occur on city and county levels that are often not reported statewide.

- **Conduct follow-up research to the literature reviews.** Similarly, many allegations are made in the reports and books that we analyzed and summarized. Those allegations are often not substantiated in any way and are inherently time limited by the date of the writing. Despite this, various interested parties frequently cite such reports and books as evidence of fraud or intimidation. Therefore, we recommend as a follow up to the literature review, an analysis of the resolution, if any, of specific instances of fraud and intimidation cited in the books and reports reviewed in the first phase.
- **Review a sampling of state district court cases.** In the first phase, we read and analyzed over 44,000 cases. Unfortunately, few of these were found to be on point. We therefore recommend that in the second phase, research should be concentrated on a national sampling of state district court level electoral cases. Often the district courts settle important issues that are not subsequently appealed. We believe that there could be a storehouse of information regarding vote fraud and intimidation in these cases.
- **Survey state election fraud and intimidation laws.** We recommend that there be a sampling of state electoral laws (including criminal penalty provisions), in order to aid in the development of model legislation that would address voter fraud and intimidation.
- **Review which states collect data on fraud and intimidation.** Evidently a few states, such as Arkansas and Georgia, collect and maintain data on complaints of fraud and intimidation and the disposition of those allegations at the state level. Phase two should examine what other states have such information and seek to obtain it for review and analysis. Policies and protocols on gathering such information in these states should also be looked at as possible models for the states that do not employ this practice.
- **Analyze data collected by various organizations in the 2006 election.** Several organizations, such as Election Protection, 1-800-MYVOTE1, and the parties will be setting up hotlines and sending people into the field during the upcoming mid-term elections both to assist voters and compile complete records of complaints and incidents from the period of voter registration through Election Day. Some of

these organizations have already agreed to share their data with the phase two EAC project consultants. We recommend that such data be used to the greatest extent possible to assess the incidence and the nature of the fraud and intimidation that occurred.

- **Obtain and analyze data retained by the Department of Justice.** Although according to a recent GAO report the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice tracks complaints of voter intimidation in a variety of ways,ⁱ the Section was extremely reluctant to provide the consultants with useful information. Further attempts should be made to obtain relevant data. This includes the telephone logs of complaints the Section keeps and information from the database – the Interactive Case Management (ICM) system – the Section maintains on complaints received and the corresponding action taken. We also recommend that further research include a review and analysis of the observer and monitor field reports from Election Day that must be filed with the Section.
- **Obtain and analyze a sampling of DEO Reports.** Similarly, the consultants believe it would be useful for any further research to include a review of the reports that must be filed by every DEO to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As noted above, the DEOs play a central role in receiving reports of voter fraud and investigating and pursuing them. Their reports would likely provide tremendous insight into what actually transpired during the last several elections. Where necessary, information could be redacted or kept confidential.
- **Attend the Department of Justice’s Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium.** The consultants also believe it would be useful for any further activity in this area to include attendance at the next Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium.² According to the Department, DEOs are required to attend annual training conferences centered on combating election fraud and voting rights abuses. These conferences sponsored by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division and the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, feature presentations by civil rights officials and senior prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.ⁱⁱ
- **Consult with an academic/academic institution with unimpeachable political science statistical research credentials.** Included in this report is a summary of

² By attending the symposium researchers could learn more about the following:

How *DEOs* are trained, e.g. what they are taught to focus their resources on; How they are instructed to respond to various types of complaints; How information about previous elections and voting issues is presented; and, How the Voting Rights Act, the criminal laws governing election fraud and intimidation, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act are described and explained to participants.

various methodologies political scientists and others suggested to measure voter fraud and intimidation. While we note the skepticism of the Working Group in this regard, we nonetheless recommend that in order to further the mission of providing unbiased data, further activity in this area include an academic institution and/or individual that focuses on sound, statistical methods for political science research.

- **Review and Assess Whether Current Federal Laws on Fraud and Intimidation are Adequate.** Finally, we recommend that phase two project researchers review federal laws to explore ways to make it easier to impose either civil or criminal penalties for acts of intimidation that do not necessarily involve racial animus and/or a physical or economic threats.

According to Craig Donsanto, long-time director of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice,

As with other statutes addressing voter intimidation, in the absence of any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is the Criminal Division's position that section 1973gg-10(1) applies only to intimidation which is accomplished through the use of threats of physical or economic duress. Voter "intimidation" accomplished through less drastic means may present violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b), which are enforced by the Civil Rights Division through noncriminal remedies.ⁱⁱⁱ

Mr. Donsanto reiterated these points to us on several occasions, including at the working group meeting.

The second phase of this project should examine if current laws can be revised or new laws drafted that would address voter intimidation that does not threaten the voter physically or financially, but rather threatens the voter's right to vote as *something of tangible value in itself*. Such legislation would penalize all forms of voter intimidation, regardless of the motivation. The law would, *for example*, potentially cover letters and postcards with contain language meant to deter voters from voting and pre-Election and Election Day challenges that are clearly illegitimate.

In the alternative to finding a way to penalize such behavior, researchers might examine ways to deter and punish voter intimidation under civil law. For example, there might be a private right of action created for voters or groups who have been subjected to intimidation tactics in the voting process. Such an action could be brought against individual offenders; any state or local actor where there is an unchecked pattern of repeated abuse; and organizations that intentionally engage in intimidating practices. Civil damage penalties and attorney fees should be included. Another, more modest measure, as has been suggested by Ana Henderson

and Christopher Edley,^{iv} would be to bring fines for violations under the Voting Rights Act up to parity. Currently, the penalty for fraud is \$10,000 while the penalty for acts to deprive the right to vote is \$5,000.

ⁱ *Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related Voting Irregularities*: General Accounting Office, October 14, 2004, GAO-04-1041R, p. 4. This same report criticizes some of the procedures the Section used for these systems and urged the Department to improve upon them in time for the 2004 presidential election. No follow-up report has been done since that time to the best of our knowledge.

ⁱⁱ *Department Of Justice To Hold Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Symposium*: U.S. Department of Justice press release, August 2, 2005.

ⁱⁱⁱ Craig C. Donsanto, *Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United States Federal Law*, IFES Political Finance White Paper Series, 2006, p. 29.

^{iv} Ana Henderson and Christopher Edley, Jr., *Voting Rights Act Reauthorization: Research-Based Recommendations to Improve Voting Access*, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, 2006, p. 29

Vote Fraud, Intimidation & Suppression In The 2004 Presidential Election

American Center for Voting Rights Report

According to its website," the American Center For Voting Rights Legislative Fund was founded in February 2005 on the belief that public confidence in our electoral system is the cornerstone of our democracy... ACVR Legislative Fund supports election reform that protects the right of all citizens to participate in the election process free of intimidation, discrimination or harassment and which will make it easy to vote but tough to cheat.

Using court records, police reports and news articles, ACVR Legislative Fund presented this Report documenting hundreds of reported incidents and allegations from around the country. ACVR Legislative Fund found that thousands of Americans were disenfranchised by illegal votes cast on Election Day 2004. For every illegal vote cast and counted on Election Day, a legitimate voter is disenfranchised. This report alleges a coordinated effort by members of some organizations to rig the election system through voter registration fraud, the first step in any vote fraud scheme that corrupts the election process by burying local officials in fraudulent and suspicious registration forms. ACVR Legislative Fund further found that, despite their heated rhetoric, paid Democrat operatives were far more involved in voter intimidation and suppression activities than were their Republican counterparts during the 2004 presidential election.

In addition to recommended changes and a zero-tolerance commitment by the political parties, ACVR Legislative Fund has identified five cities as "hot spots" which require additional immediate attention. These cities were identified based on the findings of this report and the cities' documented history of fraud and intimidation. These cities are: Philadelphia, PA, Milwaukee, WI, Seattle, WA, St. Louis/East St. Louis, MO/IL, and Cleveland, OH.

Without going into great detail in this review, this Report: refutes charges of voter intimidation and suppression made against Republican supporters, discusses similar charges against Democrats, details incidents vote fraud and illegal voting and finally discusses problems with vote fraud, voter registration fraud and election irregularities around the country. The majority of this Report is an attempt to redeem Republicans and vilify Democrats.

In terms of sheer numbers, the report most often alleges voter intimidation and voter registration fraud, and to a lesser degree absentee ballot fraud and vote buying.

The Report presented the following recommendations for future action:

* Both national political parties should formally adopt a zero-tolerance fraud and intimidation policy that commits the party to pursuing and fully prosecuting individuals and allied organizations who commit vote fraud or who seek to deter any eligible voter from participating in the election through fraud or intimidation. No amount of legislative

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reform can effectively deter those who commit acts of fraud if there is no punishment for the crime and these acts continue to be tolerated.

* States should adopt legislation requiring government-issued photo ID at the polls and for any voter seeking to vote by mail or by absentee ballot. Government-issued photo identification should be readily available to all citizens without cost and provisions made to assure availability of government-issued identification to disabled and low-income citizens.

* States should adopt legislation requiring that all polling places be fully accessible and accommodating to all voters regardless of race, disability or political persuasion and that polling locations are free of intimidation or harassment.

* States should create and maintain current and accurate statewide voter registration databases as mandated by the federal Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") and establish procedures to assure that the statewide voter roll is current and accurate and that the names of eligible voters on the roll are consistent with the voter roll used by local election authorities in conducting the election.

* States should adopt legislation establishing a 30-day voter registration cutoff to assure that all voter rolls are accurate and that all registrants can cast a regular ballot on Election Day and the election officials have opportunity to establish a current and accurate voter roll without duplicate or fictional names and assure that all eligible voters (including all recently registered voters) are included on the voter roll at their proper precinct.

* States should adopt legislation requiring voter registration applications to be delivered to the elections office within one week of being completed so that they are processed in a timely manner and to assure the individuals registered by third party organizations are properly included on the voter roll.

* States should adopt legislation and penalties for groups violating voter registration laws, and provide the list of violations and penalties to all registration solicitors. Legislation should require those organizations obtaining a voter's registration to deliver that registration to election officials in a timely manner and should impose appropriate penalties upon any individual or organization that obtains an eligible voter's registration and fails to deliver it to election authorities.

* States should adopt legislation prohibiting "bounty" payment to voter registration solicitors based on the number of registration cards they collect.

America's Modern Poll Tax: How Structural Disenfranchisement Erodes Democracy

Advancement Project

The thesis of the Report, America's Modern Poll Tax, written after the 2000 election, is that structural disenfranchisement—the effect of breakdowns in the electoral system, is the new poll tax. Structural disenfranchisement includes “bureaucratic blunders, governmental indifference, and flagrant disregard for voting rights.” The blame for structural disenfranchisement is laid squarely at the feet of states and localities that “shirk their responsibilities or otherwise manipulate election systems,” resulting in voters “either turned away from the polls or their votes are thrown out.”

The interlocking practices and mechanics that comprise structural disenfranchisement are referred to a “ballot blockers” in the report. Most ballot blockers involve the structural elements of electoral administration: “ill-trained poll workers, failures to process registration cards on time or at all, inaccurate registration rolls, overbroad purges of voter rolls, unreasonably long lines, inaccurate ballot translations and a shortage of translators to assist voters who have limited English language skills.” The Report argues that a culture of indifference overlays these issues that both tolerates and excuses widespread disenfranchisement. This culture of indifference is exemplified by legislatures that do not properly fund election systems, officials that send antiquated equipment into poor and minority areas, poorly translated ballots and polling places that are not wheelchair accessible.

The data and conclusions in the Report are taken from eight sample case studies of states and cities across the country and a survey of state election directors that reinforces the findings of the case studies. Examples of state and city problems were: New York City—in six polling places Chinese translations inverted the Democrats with the Republicans; Georgia—the state computer crashed two weeks before the election, dropping thousands of voters from the rolls; Virginia—registration problems kept an untold number from voting; Chicago—in inner-city precincts with predominately minority populations, almost four out of every ten votes cast for President (in 2000) were discarded; St. Louis—thousands of qualified voters were placed on inactive lists due to an overbroad purge; Florida—a voting list purge of voters whose name and birth date closely resembled those of people convicted of felonies; and, Texas—significant Jim Crow like barriers to minority voting.

The survey of state election directors found: election directors lack the resources to effectively do their jobs and some lack the “ability or will to force local election officials to fix serious problems”; election officials are highly under funded and legislatures refuse to grant their requests for more money; due to a lack of funds, election officials must use old and inferior equipment and can't improve training or meet structural needs; election officials are generally unaware of racial disparities in voting; only three of the 50 state election administrators are non-white.

The Report “concludes that affected communities and democracy advocates should mobilize to force change.” A number of recommendations are made to protect the

electoral franchise including: Federal policies that set nationwide and uniform election policies; federal guarantee of access to provisional ballots; enforcement of voter disability laws; automatic restoration of voting rights to those convicted of a crime after they have completed their sentence; a centralized data base of voters administered by non-partisan individuals; federal standards limiting precinct discarded vote rates to .25 %; federal requirements that jurisdiction provide voter education, including how to protect their right to vote; and laws that strengthen the ability of individuals to bring actions to enforce voting rights and anti-discrimination laws.

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the White House by David E. Johnson & Jonny R. Johnson

A Funny Thing Happened adds almost nothing to the present study. It contains no footnotes and no references to primary source material, save what may be able to be gleaned from the bibliography. The Johnsons take a historical look at United States Presidential elections from Andrew Jackson to George Bush by providing interesting stories and other historical information. Unfortunately, there are only three pages out of the entire book that touches on vote fraud in the first Bush election.

The authors assert that the exit polls in Florida were probably correct. The problem was the pollsters had no way of knowing that thousands of votes would be invalidated. But the authors do not believe that fraud was the cause of the tabulation inaccuracy. The major cause was undervotes and overvotes which, if all counted, would have altered the result, compounded by the use of the butterfly ballot in some strategic counties. Additionally, Ralph Nader's votes were primarily a bleed off of needed Gore votes. The authors accused Katherine Harris, then Florida Secretary of State and co-chair of the Bush campaign in Florida for prematurely certifying the state vote. The authors also ridiculed United States Secretary of State James A. Baker III, for using the courts to block attempts to hand count votes. Finally, the authors indicated that a mob of Republican partisans descended on the vote counters in Dade County and effectively stopped the count.

Analysis of the September 15, 2005 Voter Fraud Report Submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General

By The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Dr. Michael McDonald of George Mason University

General

A September 15, 2005 Report submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General included lists of purportedly illegitimate votes in New Jersey in the 2004 general election, including lists of 10,969 individuals who purportedly voted twice and lists of 4,756 voters who were purportedly dead or incarcerated in November 2004. For the present Analysis of the Report, the lists of voters submitted to the New Jersey Attorney General, as well as a copy of the New Jersey county voter registration files were obtained, and an initial investigation of the report's claims was conducted. The analysis shows that the lists submitted are substantially flawed.

The Analysis is based on methodology only: its authors did not gain access to original documents related to registration or original pollbook records; only recently were copies of the counties' original registration data files acquired and compiled, which contain some notable gaps; and the lists submitted to the Attorney General contain significant errors and little documentation, which complicated the analysis. Nonetheless, the analysts say that information collected is sufficient for generally assessing the quality of evidence presented to support the September 15 report. Analysis of the suspect lists reveals that the evidence submitted does not show what it purports to show: cause for concern that there is serious risk of widespread fraud given the state of the New Jersey voter registration rolls.

These suspect lists were compiled by attempting to match the first name, last name, and birth date of persons on county voter registration files. Entries that supposedly "matched" other entries were apparently deemed to represent the same individual, voting twice. This methodology was similar to the method used in compiling the notoriously inaccurate Florida "purge lists" of suspected ineligible felons in 2000 and 2004. As Florida's experience shows, matching names and birth dates in the voter registration context can easily lead to false conclusions – as was almost certainly the case here.

This Analysis reveals several serious problems with the methodology used to compile the suspect lists that compromise the lists' practical value. For example, the data used in the Report from one county appears to be particularly suspect and anomalous, and may have substantially skewed the overall results. In addition, middle initials were ignored throughout all counties, so that "J _____ A. Smith" was presumed to be the same person as "J _____ G. Smith." Suffixes were also ignored, so that fathers and sons – like "B _____ Johnson" and "B _____ Johnson, Jr." – were said to be the same person.

Underlying many of the entries on these lists, and similar lists compiled in Florida and elsewhere, is a presumption that two records with the same name and date of birth must

represent the same person. As *explained* in this analysis, this presumption is not consistent with basic statistical principles. Even when votes appear to have been cast in two different cities under the same name and birth date, statistics show that voter fraud is not necessarily to blame. With 3.6 million persons who voted in the 2004 election in New Jersey, the chance that some have the same name and birth date is not far-fetched.

Analysis of the Claim of Double Voting by 4,497 Individuals

Attempts to match data on one list to data on another list will often yield “false positives:” two records that at first appear to be a match but do not actually represent the same person. The natural incidence of “false positives” for a matching exercise of this scale – especially when, as here, conducted with relatively little attention to detail – readily explains the ostensible number of double votes.

1,803 of these 4,397 records of ostensibly illegal votes seem to be the product of a glitch in the compilation of the registration files. These records reflect two registration entries by the same person from the same address, with a notation next to each that the individual has voted. For example, 55-year-old W_____ A. Connors, living at 253 B_____ Ave. in a New York commuter suburb, is listed on the data files with an (erroneous) first registration date in 1901 and a second registration date in 1993; Mr. Connors is thus represented twice on the data files submitted. Each of these entries also indicates that W_____ A. Connors at 253 B_____ Ave voted in 2004. There is no credible indication, however, that Mr. Connors actually voted twice; indeed, given the clearly erroneous registration date on the files, it is far more likely that data error is to blame for the doubly logged vote as well.

More plausibly, the bulk of these 1,803 records may be traced to irregularities in the data processing and compilation process for one single county: the Middlesex County registration file accounts for only 10% of registered voters in the state but 78% of these alleged double votes. The suspect lists themselves contain an acknowledgment that the problem in Middlesex is probably not fraud: 99% of these Middlesex voters are labeled on the lists submitted to the Attorney General with a notation that the record is “less likely” to indicate an illegal double vote.

Another 1,257 entries of the 4,397 records probably represent similar data errors – also largely driven by a likely glitch in the Middlesex County file, which is also vastly over represented in this category. These records show ever-so-slight variations in records listed with the same date of birth at the same address: for example, the same first and last names, but different middle initials or suffixes (e.g., J_____ T. Kearns, Sr., and J_____ T. Kearns, Jr., both born the same day and living at the same address; or J_____ E. Allen and J_____ P. Allen, born the same day and living at the same address).

Approximately 800 of the entries on the list likely represent different people, with different addresses and different middle initials or suffixes. For example, W_____ S. Smith, living in a northern New Jersey town, and W_____ C. Smith, living in another town two hours away, share the same date of birth but are not the same person. Nor are

T _____ Brown, living in a New York commuter suburb, and T _____ H. Brown, Jr., living in a small town over an hour west, despite the fact that they also share the same birth date. About three-quarters of the entries in this category reveal data that affirmatively conflict – for example, a middle initial (“W _____ S.”) in one case, and a different middle initial (“W _____ C.”) in another, listed at different addresses. There is absolutely no good reason to conclude that these individuals are in fact the same, when the available evidence indicates the contrary.

For approximately 200 of the entries in this category, however, less information is available. These entries show a middle initial (“J _____ W. Davis”) in one case, and no middle initial (“J _____ Davis”) in another – again, at different addresses. The lack of the middle initial is ambiguous: it could mean that one of the J _____ Davis in question has no middle name, or it could mean that the middle initial was simply omitted in a particular registration entry. Although these entries involve less conclusive affirmative evidence of a false match than the entries noted above, there is still no good reason to believe that “J _____ W. Davis” and “J _____ Davis,” at different addresses, represent the same person.

Of the individuals remaining, there are serious concerns with the accuracy of the dates of birth. Seven voters were apparently born in January 1, 1880 – which is most likely a system default for registrations lacking date-of-birth information. For 227 voters, only the month and year of birth are listed: this means only that two voters with the same name were born in the same month and year, an unsurprising coincidence in a state of several million people.

That leaves approximately 289 votes cast under the same name and birth date – like votes cast by “P _____ S. Rosen,” born in the middle of the baby boom – but from two different addresses. It may appear strange, but there may be two P _____ S. Rosens, born on the same date in 1948 – and such coincidences are surprisingly common. For any one person, the odds of someone else having the same name and birth date is small. But because there are so many voters in New Jersey, a sizable number will have the same name and birth date simply by chance. In a group of just 23 people, it is more likely than not that two will share the same birthday. For 40 people, the probability is 90%. Many, if not most, of the 289 alleged double votes of persons registered at different addresses most likely reflect two separate individuals sharing a first name, last name, middle initial, and birth date.

The September 15 Report makes much of the raw potential for foul play based on the unsurprising fact that there are voters who appear on the New Jersey registration rolls more than once. As noted above, many of the names identified reflect two different individuals and not simply duplicate entries. But there is no doubt that there are duplicate entries on New Jersey’s registration rolls. It is well known that voter registration rolls contain “deadwood” – registration entries for individuals no longer living at a given address or deceased. There is no evidence, however, that these extra registrations are used for widespread illegal voting. Moreover, the problem of deadwood will soon be largely resolved: both the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America

Vote Act of 2002 require states to implement several systems and procedures as of January 1, 2006, that will clean the voter rolls of duplicate or invalid entries while protecting eligible voters from unintended disfranchisement.

Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform

**By The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton,
Commissioner and Law Professor at George Washington University School of Law**

Introduction

On September 19, 2005, the Commission on Federal Election Reform, co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker III, issued a report with recommendations for reforming the administration of U.S. elections. This Response addresses the main substantive flaws in the Report, refuting in detail its recommendations that “Real ID” cards be used for voter identification, that Social Security numbers be spread through interstate databases and on ID cards, and that states restore voting rights to people convicted of felony convictions only in certain cases and only after they have completed all the terms of their sentence.

Voter Identification Recommendation

According to the Response, the Report’s most troubling recommendation is that states require voters to present a Real ID card or a similar “template” ID as a condition of voting. This recommendation is more onerous than the photo ID proposal rejected by the Commission’s predecessor in 2001 and is more restrictive than any ID requirement adopted in any state to date. It would impose substantial – and for some, insurmountable – burdens on the right to vote. This ID requirement is purportedly intended to prevent “voter fraud,” and yet the Report itself concedes that “[t]here is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting” before asserting, without any meaningful support, that “both occur.” Not only does the Report fail to justify the creation of stringent identification requirements, but it also does not explain why the goals of improved election integrity will not be met through the existing provisions in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Additionally, the Report fails to consider alternative measures to advance its goals that are less restrictive to voters.

The Commission’s recommendation that eligible citizens be barred from voting unless they are able to present a souped-up “Real ID” card is a proposal guaranteed to disenfranchise a substantial number of eligible voters. Millions of Americans currently do not have driver’s licenses or government-issued photo ID cards. As the 2001 National Commission on Federal Election Reform recognized, research shows that between six and ten percent of voting-age Americans do not have driver’s licenses or state-issued non-driver’s photo ID. That translates into as many as 20 million eligible voters. Millions more may never get the new Real ID card, which requires substantially more cost and effort. The percentage of Americans without the documentary proof of citizenship necessary to obtain Real IDs is likely to remain high because, as discussed below, the requisite documents are both expensive and burdensome to obtain. The Report’s proposal to use Real ID as a condition of voting is so excessive that it would prevent eligible voters from proving their identity with even a valid U.S. passport or a U.S. military photo ID card. While Americans of all backgrounds would be excluded by the Report’s ID proposal, the burden would fall disproportionately on the elderly, the disabled, students, the poor, and people of color.

According to the Georgia chapter of the AARP, 36 percent of Georgians over age 75 do not have a driver's license. In Wisconsin, approximately 23 percent of persons aged 65 and older do not have driver's licenses or photo ID, and fewer than 3 percent of students have driver's licenses listing their current address. Across the country, more than 3 million Americans with disabilities do not have a driver's license or other form of state-issued photo ID. Moreover, given the frequency with which Americans move residences, it is likely that a far greater percentage of citizens lack driver's licenses or photo IDs bearing their current addresses. Since voting generally depends on the voter's address, and since many states will not accept IDs that do not bear an individual's current voting address, an additional 41.5 million Americans each year will have ID that they may not be able to use to vote.

As the Report recognizes, government-issued photo identification costs money. Thus, if required as a precondition for voting, photo identification would operate as a de facto poll tax that could disenfranchise low-income voters. To alleviate this burden, the Report appropriately recommends that the "Real ID" card itself be issued free of charge. This safeguard, however, does not address some of the most significant predicate costs in obtaining photo identification – costs incurred whether or not the card itself is free. First, each of the documents an individual is required to show in order to obtain a "Real ID" card or other government-issued photo ID card costs money or presumes a minimal level of economic resources. A certified copy of a birth certificate costs from \$10.00 to \$45.00, depending on the state; a passport costs \$85.00; and certified naturalization papers cost \$19.95. Unless the federal and all state governments waive the cost of each of these other forms of identification, the indirect costs of photo IDs will be even greater than their direct costs. In addition, since government-issued IDs may only be obtained at specified government offices, which may be far from voters' residences and workplaces, individuals seeking such IDs will have to incur transportation costs and the costs of taking time off from work to visit those offices during often-abbreviated business hours. These are not insignificant burdens.

Strong empirical evidence also shows that photo ID requirements disproportionately burden people of color. The ID recommendations reduce the benefits of voter registration at disability and other social service agencies provided by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Individuals who seek to register at those offices—which generally do not issue IDs – will also have to make an additional visit to the motor vehicle department in order to obtain the documentation necessary to vote. Census data demonstrate that African Americans and Latinos are more than three times more likely than whites to register to vote at a public assistance agency, and that whites are more likely than African Americans and Latinos to register when seeking a driver's license. Accordingly, the voter registration procedure far more likely to be used by minorities than by whites will no longer provide Americans with full eligibility to vote. Not only are minority voters less likely to possess the requisite ID, but they are also more likely than white voters to be asked to furnish ID at the polls. As the Task Force Report of the prior Commission found, identification requirements create the opportunity for selective enforcement – either innocuous or invidious – when poll workers request photo ID only from voters

unknown to them. This discretion has often led to special scrutiny of minority voters at the polls.

Faced with overwhelming evidence that Real IDs are both costly and difficult to obtain, the Report suggests that Real ID cards be made “easily available and issued free of charge.” While this is a laudable goal, the evidence suggests that it will not be attained. First, no State currently issues photo IDs free of charge to all voters. And even if the card itself were free, the Real ID would not be “free of charge” unless all documents required to obtain the Real ID were also “free of charge.” In addition, no State makes photo IDs “easily available” to all its citizens.

The Report premises its burdensome identification proposals on the need to ensure ballot integrity and on the existence of or potential for widespread fraud. However, the Report admits that there is simply “no evidence” that the type of fraud that could be solved by stricter voter identification – individual voters who misrepresent their identity at the polls – is a widespread problem. Indeed, the evidence that does exist shows that this sort of fraud occurs only at an extremely low rate. The Report’s photo ID proposal guards against only one type of fraud: individuals arriving at the polls to vote using false information, such as the name of another registered voter, or a recent but not current address. Since the costs of this form of fraud are extremely high (federal law provides for up to five years’ imprisonment), and the benefits to any individual voter are extremely low, it is highly unlikely that this will ever occur with any frequency. The limited types of fraud that could be prevented by a Real ID requirement are extremely rare and difficult. As the Report concedes, there is “no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections” of the sort that can be cured by photo identification requirements. This admission – and not the hypothetical specter of fraud represented in the remainder of the Report – is amply borne out by independent research.

In the most comprehensive survey of alleged election fraud to date, Professor Loraine Minnite and David Callahan have shown that the incidence of individual voter fraud at the polls is negligible. A few prominent examples support their findings. In Ohio, a statewide survey found four instances of ineligible persons voting or attempting to vote in 2002 and 2004, out of 9,078,728 votes cast – a rate of 0.00004%. Earlier this year, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox stated that she could not recall one documented case of voter fraud relating to the impersonation of a registered voter at the polls during her ten-year tenure as Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State. The Report attempts to support its burdensome identification requirements on four specific examples of purported fraud or potential fraud. **None of the Report’s cited examples of fraud stand up under closer scrutiny.** This response report goes through each instance of fraud raised by the Commission report and demonstrates that in each case the allegation in fact turned out later not to be true or the fraud cited was not of the type that would be addressed by a photo identification requirement.

The Report fails to provide a good reason to create greater hurdles for voters who vote at the polls than for those who vote absentee. Despite the fact that absentee ballots are more

susceptible to fraud than regular ballots, the Report exempts absentee voters from its proposed Real ID and proof of citizenship requirements.

To the extent that any limited fraud by individuals at the polls does trickle into the system, it can be addressed by far less restrictive alternatives. The first step is to recognize that only voters who appear on the registration list may vote a regular ballot. Proper cleaning of registration lists – and proper use of the lists at the poll–will therefore go a long way toward ensuring that every single ballot is cast by an eligible voter. Existing law has already accounted for this need – with proper safeguards for individual voters – and needs only adequate implementation. If inflated rolls create the specter of potential fraud, for example, the problem will be addressed by proper execution of the registration list related provisions of NVRA and HAVA, which are designed in part to remove ineligible voters from the rolls. In addition to the better registration lists that full implementation will provide, better record keeping and administration at the polls will reduce the limited potential for voting by ineligible persons. In the unlikely event that implementation of current law is not able to wipe out whatever potential for individual fraud remains, there are several effective and less burdensome alternatives to the Report's Real ID recommendation that received wholly insufficient consideration.

Recommendation on Database Information Sharing Across States

It is unquestionably beneficial to account for voters who move across state lines. Nonetheless, the Report fails to consider the serious efficacy, privacy, and security concerns raised by a nationally distributed database of the magnitude it contemplates. These problems are exacerbated by the Report's recommendation that an individual's Social Security number be used as the broadly disseminated unique voting identifier. The Report's recommendation creates substantial privacy and security hazards. The Report recommends –without any discussion–that the information used as an individual's unique fingerprint to track a voter across state lines include not merely the date of birth, but also the person's "place of birth." As with the Social Security number, this information is often used as a key to private information wholly unrelated to voting, and as such, disclosure presents a substantial security hazard. Moreover, this information seems particularly susceptible to use in harassing legitimate voters, particularly naturalized citizens.

Recommendation on Voting Rights of Ex-Felons

The Report recommends that states restore voting rights only to certain people with criminal convictions, and only after they have "fully served their sentence." This overly restrictive standard places the Commission out of step with the states, the American public, and the laws of other nations. This recommendation would set a standard more generous than the policies of the most regressive thirteen states in the nation but more restrictive than the remaining thirty-seven. The trend in the states is toward extension of the franchise. Since 1997, twelve states have reformed their laws or policies to allow more people with convictions to vote. These reforms are driven by some startling numbers. Approximately 4.7 million Americans have lost the right to vote because of a criminal conviction. This number includes 1.4 million African-American men, whose 13% rate of disenfranchisement is seven times the national average. More than 670,000

of the disenfranchised are women; more than 580,000 are veterans; and 1.7 million have completed their sentences.

The American people also support more generous re-enfranchisement than the Commission Report recommends. In a 2002 telephone survey of 1,000 Americans nationwide, researchers found that substantial majorities (64% and 62% respectively) supported allowing probationers and parolees to vote. Fully 80% favored restoring the franchise to people who had completed felony sentences. Even when questions were asked about certain unpopular offenses, majorities supported voting rights. Two-thirds of respondents supported allowing violent ex-felons to vote; 63% supported allowing ex-felons convicted of illegal stock-trading to vote; and 52% supported restoring the franchise to ex-felons who had been convicted of a sex crime. International norms are even more favorable to voting rights. Moreover, the Report's recommendation is unworkable. The general rule – that reenfranchisement should follow the completion of a criminal sentence – is itself difficult to administer.

Republican Ballot Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – Or Both?

By Chandler Davidson

As the author describes it, this Report focuses on vote suppression through “ballot security programs”:

These are programs that, in the name of protecting against vote fraud, almost exclusively target heavily black, Latino, or Indian voting precincts and have the intent or effect of discouraging or preventing voters in those precincts from casting a ballot. In some cases, these programs have been found by courts to be illegal. Still, they continue to exist in spite of strong criticism by leaders of minority communities, their allies, and voting rights lawyers.

There are several noteworthy characteristics of these programs. They focus on minority precincts almost exclusively. There is often only the flimsiest evidence that vote fraud is likely to be perpetrated in such precincts. In addition to encouraging the presence of sometimes intimidating Republican poll watchers or challengers who may slow down voting lines and embarrass potential voters by asking them humiliating questions, these programs have sometimes posted people in official-looking uniforms with badges and side arms who question voters about their citizenship or their registration. In addition, warning signs may be posted near the polls, or radio ads may be targeted to minority listeners containing dire threats of prison terms for people who are not properly registered—messages that seem designed to put minority voters on the defensive. Sometimes false information about voting qualifications is sent to minority voters through the mail.”

He further states that a most common theme of the programs over the last 50 years is that of sending white challengers to minority precincts. He says that the tactic of doing mailings, collecting returned materials, and using that as a basis for creating challenger lists and challenging voters at the polls, started in the 1950s and continues to today. The problem with this practice is that reasons for a mailing to be returned include a wrong address, out of date or inaccurate addresses, poor mail delivery in minority areas, and matching mistakes. Davidson also sets out to demonstrate through documentary evidence that the practices have been and are approved of or winked at by high ups in the party.

Davidson goes on to provide numerous examples from the last 50 years to demonstrate his thesis, going through the historical development of Republican ballot security programs from the 1950s through to the present. The author cites and quotes internal Republican letters and memoranda, primary sources and original documents, media

reports, scholarly works, as well as the words of judges' rulings in some of the cases that ended up in litigation to prove his argument.

In addition to describing how the schemes really were brought to the fore in the 1964 election, he describes more recent incidents such as 1981 in New Jersey, 1982 Dallas, Louisiana 1986, Houston 1986, Hidalgo 1988 Orange County 1988, North Carolina 1990, South Carolina 1980-1990, and South Dakota 2002. (Summaries of these examples are available)

Davidson concludes with an outline of some of the features of vote suppression efforts put forth by Republicans under the guise of ballot security programs, as described in the Report, from the 1950s to the present day:

1. An organized, often widely publicized effort to field poll watchers in what Republicans call "heavily Democratic," but what are usually minority, precincts;
2. Stated concerns about vote fraud in these precincts, which are occasionally justified but often are not;
3. Misinformation and fear campaigns directed at these same precincts, spread by radio, posted signs in the neighborhoods, newspapers, fliers, and phone calls, which are often anonymously perpetrated;
4. Posting "official-looking" personnel at polling places, including but not limited to off-duty police—sometimes in uniform, sometimes armed;
5. Aggressive face-to-face challenging techniques at the polls that can confuse, humiliate, and intimidate—as well as slow the voting process—in these same minority precincts;
6. Challenging voters using inaccurate, unofficial lists of registrants derived from "do-not-forward" letters sent to low-income and minority neighborhoods;
7. Photographing, tape recording, or videotaping voters; and
8. Employing language and metaphors that trade on stereotypes of minority voters as venal and credulous.

The report ends with some observations on the state of research on the incidence of fraud, which the author finds lacking. He suggests that vote suppression of qualified minority voters by officials and partisan poll-watchers, challengers, and uniformed guards should also be considered as included in any definition of election fraud. Davidson also offers a few recommendations for reform, noting that Democrats should not protest all programs aimed at ballot integrity, but rather work with Republicans to find solutions to problems that confront both parties and the system as a whole.

A 'Crazy-Quilt' of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal Disenfranchisement Law

By Alec Ewald

"A Crazy-Quilt of Tiny Pieces" presents results from the first nationwide study to document the implementation of American felony disenfranchisement law. Data came from two main sources: a 33-state survey of state elections officials and telephone interviews with almost one hundred city, county, town, and parish officials drawn from 10 selected states. In the spring of 2004, a two-page survey consisting of questions regarding disqualification and restoration procedures was sent to the offices of the statewide elections director in each of the fifty states. Responses were collected through the summer and early fall of 2004. Thirty-three states responded. No state currently administers and enforces its criminal disqualification and restoration laws in an efficient, universally-understood and equitable way. Some do not appear to notify local elections officials of convictions, or do not do so in a clear and timely way; others risk "false positives" in disqualification, particularly with suspended sentences or offenses not subject to disenfranchisement; many ask local officials to handle disqualification and restoration with little or no guidance or supervision from the state; none have clear policies regarding new arrivals from other states with old convictions.

The report reaches seven major conclusions:

1. Broad variation and misunderstanding in interpretation and enforcement of voting laws:
 - More than one-third (37%) of local officials interviewed in ten states either described their state's fundamental eligibility law incorrectly, or stated that they did not know a central aspect of that law.
 - Local registrars differ in their knowledge of basic eligibility law, often within the same state. Differences also emerge in how they are notified of criminal convictions, what process they use to suspend, cancel, or "purge" voters from the rolls, whether particular documents are required to restore a voter to eligibility, and whether they have information about the criminal background of new arrivals to the state.
2. Misdemeanants disenfranchised in at least five states:
 - The commonly-used term "felon disenfranchisement" is not entirely accurate, since at least five states – Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, South Carolina, and Maryland -- also formally bar some or all people convicted of misdemeanors from voting.
 - It is likely that misdemeanants in other states who do retain the formal right to vote could have difficulty exercising that right, given ignorance of their eligibility and the lack of clear rules and procedures for absentee voting by people in jail who have not been convicted of a felony.
 - Maryland excludes persons convicted of many misdemeanors, such as "Unlawful operation of vending machines," "Misrepresentation of tobacco leaf weight," and "Racing horse under false name."
3. Significant ambiguities in voting laws:
 - Disenfranchisement in Tennessee is dependent on which of five different time periods a felony conviction occurred between 1973 and the present.
 - In Oregon, disenfranchisement is determined not by conviction or imprisonment for a felony, but for being placed under Department of Corrections supervision. Since 1997, some persons

convicted of a felony and sentenced to less than 12 months' custody have been sent to county jails and hence, are eligible to vote.

4. Disenfranchisement results in contradictory policies within states:

- The "crazy-quilt" pattern of disenfranchisement laws exists even within states. Alabama and Mississippi have both the most and least restrictive laws in the country, a result which is brought about by the fact that certain felonies result in the loss of voting rights for life, while others at least theoretically permit people in prison to vote.
- Most felonies in Alabama result in permanent disenfranchisement, but drug and DUI offenses have been determined to not involve the "moral turpitude" that triggers the loss of voting rights.
- In Mississippi, ten felonies result in disenfranchisement, but do not include such common offenses as burglary and drug crimes.

5. Confusing policies lead to the exclusion of legal voters and the inclusion of illegal voters:

- The complexity of state disenfranchisement policies results in frequent misidentification of voter eligibility, largely because officials differ in their knowledge and application of disqualification and restoration law and procedures.

6. Significant variation and uncertainty in how states respond to persons with a felony conviction from other states:

- No state has a systematic mechanism in place to address the immigration of persons with a felony conviction, and there is no consensus among indefinite-disenfranchisement states on whether the disqualification is properly confined to the state of conviction, or should be considered in the new state of residence.
- Interpretation and enforcement of this part of disenfranchisement law varies not only across state lines, but also from one county to another within states. Local officials have no way of knowing about convictions in other states, and many are unsure what they would do if a would-be voter acknowledged an old conviction. Because there is no prospect of a national voter roll, this situation will continue even after full HAVA implementation.

7. Disenfranchisement is a time-consuming, expensive practice:

- Enforcement requires elections officials to gather records from different agencies and bureaucracies, including state and federal courts, Departments of Corrections, Probation and Parole, the state Board of Elections, the state police, and other counties' elections offices.

Policy Implications

1. Policies disenfranchising people living in the community on probation or parole, or who have completed a sentence are particularly difficult to enforce:

- States which disenfranchise only persons who are currently incarcerated appear able to enforce their laws more consistently than those barring non-incarcerated citizens from voting.

2. Given large-scale misunderstanding of disenfranchisement law, many eligible persons incorrectly believe they cannot vote, or have been misinformed by election officials:

- More than one-third of election officials interviewed incorrectly described their state's law on voting eligibility.
- More than 85% of the officials who misidentified their state's law either did not know the eligibility standard or specified that the law was more restrictive than was actually the case.

3. Occasional violation of disenfranchisement law by non-incarcerated voters not surprising:

- Given the complexity of state laws and the number of state officials who lack an understanding of restoration and disqualification procedures, it should come as no surprise that many voters are ignorant of their voting status, a fact that is likely to have resulted in hundreds of persons with a felony conviction registering and voting illegally in recent years.

4. Taken together, these findings undermine the most prominent rationale for disenfranchisement: that the policy reflects a strong, clear consensus that persons with a felony conviction are unfit to vote and constitute a threat to the polity:

- First, when significant numbers of the people who administer elections do not know important aspects of disenfranchisement law, it is hard to conclude that the restriction is necessary to protect social order and the “purity” of the ballot box.
- Second, because they are all but invisible in the sentencing process, “collateral” sanctions like disenfranchisement simply cannot accomplish the denunciatory, expressive purposes their supporters claim. We now know that disenfranchisement is not entirely “visible” even to the people running American elections.
- Third, deep uncertainty regarding the voting rights of people with felony convictions who move from one state to another indicates that we do not even know what purpose disenfranchisement is supposed to serve – whether it is meant to be a punishment, or simply a non-penal regulation of the franchise.

Recommendations

1. Clarify Policies Regarding Out-of-State Convictions:

- State officials should clarify their policies and incorporate into training programs the means by which a felony conviction in another state affects an applicant’s voting eligibility. For example, sentence-only disenfranchisement states should clarify that newcomers with old felony convictions from indefinite disenfranchisement states are eligible to vote. And those states which bar some people from voting even after their sentences are completed must clarify whether new arrivals with old felony convictions from sentence-only disenfranchisement states are automatically eligible, and must explain what procedures, if any, should be followed for restoration.

2. Train Election Officials:

- Clarify disenfranchisement policies and procedures for all state and local election officials through development of materials and training programs in each state. At a minimum, this should include distribution of posters, brochures and FAQ sheets to local and state elections offices.

3. Train Criminal Justice Officials:

- Provide training on disqualification and restoration policies for all correctional and criminal justice officials, particularly probation and parole staff. Correctional and criminal justice officials should also be actively engaged in describing these policies to persons under criminal justice supervision.

4. Review Voting Restrictions on Non-Incarcerated People:

- Given the serious practical difficulty of enforcing laws disqualifying people who are not incarcerated from voting – problems which clearly include both excluding eligible people from voting and allowing those who should be ineligible to vote -- state policymakers should review such policies to determine if they serve a useful public purpose.

Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, An American Political Tradition---1742-2004

by Tracy Campbell.

In Deliver the Vote, Campbell traces the historical persistence of voter fraud from colonial times through the 2004 Bush-Kerry election. From the textual information, it quickly becomes obvious that voter fraud was not limited to certain types of people or to certain political parties. Major American political figures fail to emerge unscathed. For instance, before independence, George Washington plied potential voters with drink as payment for their vote. This type of early vote buying succeeded in electing Washington to the Virginia Assembly over a heavily favored candidate. Both the Democrat and Republican Parties also participated in vote fraud. Finally, there were several regions of the country known for fraudulent voting problems such as Chicago, St. Louis, Texas, and Kentucky, especially Louisville.

Germane to the voter fraud project, Campbell indicates that in the Bush-Gore election, both camps committed major errors. Campbell contends that the central problem in that election was the 175,000 invalidated votes. It is evident that Florida was procedurally unprepared to deal with the voluminous questions that arose in determining valid from invalid votes. Campbell glosses over the Bush-Kerry election but does note from one who opposed Kerry, that there was something amiss with the Ohio final vote tally. This book is well researched and provided numerous citations to source material.

Building Confidence in U.S. Election, National Commission on Federal Election Reform ("Carter/Baker Commission")

The impetus for the Carter-Baker Commission and its report was the sense of the members that not enough had been done to reform the system since the 2000 election and that Americans had lost confidence in elections. The report makes several observations about the current system and makes 87 recommendations. Several of those recommendations are meant to be implemented in conjunction with one another in order to be effective, so the report is really a push for a comprehensive overhaul of the system as it works today.

Among the observations made that are relevant to the EAC study of fraud and intimidation are the following:

- The November 2004 elections showed that irregularities and fraud still occur.
- Failure to provide voters with such basic information as their registration status and their polling site location raises a barrier to voting as significant as inconsistent procedures on provisional ballots or voter ID requirements.
- There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.
- The Commission is concerned that the different approaches to identification cards might prove to be a serious impediment to voting.
- Voter registration lists are often inflated by the inclusion of citizens who have moved out of state but remain on the lists. Moreover, under the National Voter Registration Act, names are often added to the list, but counties and municipalities often do not delete the names of those who moved. Inflated voter lists are also caused by phony registrations and efforts to register individuals who are ineligible. At the same time, inaccurate purges of voter lists have removed citizens who are eligible and are properly registered.
- Political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives generally contribute to the electoral process by generating interest in upcoming elections and expanding participation. However, they are occasionally abused. There were reports in 2004 that some party activists failed to deliver voter registration forms of citizens who expressed a preference for the opposing party.
- Vote by mail raises concerns about privacy, as citizens voting at home may come under pressure to vote for certain candidates, and it increases the risk of fraud.
- While election fraud is difficult to measure, it occurs. The U.S. Department of Justice has launched more than 180 investigations into election fraud since October 2002. These investigations have resulted in charges for multiple voting, providing false information on their felon status, and other offenses against 89 individuals and in convictions of 52 individuals. The convictions related to a variety of election fraud offenses, from vote buying to submitting false voter registration information and voting-related offenses by non-citizens. In addition to the federal investigations, state attorneys general and local prosecutors handle cases of election fraud. Other cases are never pursued because of the difficulty in

obtaining sufficient evidence for prosecution or because of the low priority given to election fraud cases.

- Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud
- Non-citizens have registered to vote in several recent elections
- The growth of "third-party" (unofficial) voter registration drives in recent elections has led to a rise in reports of voter registration fraud.
- Many states allow the representatives of candidates or political parties to challenge a person's eligibility to register or vote or to challenge an inaccurate name on a voter roll. This practice of challenges may contribute to ballot integrity, but it can have the effect of intimidating eligible voters, preventing them from casting their ballot, or otherwise disrupting the voting process.

Its pertinent recommendations for reform are as follows:

- Interoperable state voter databases are needed to facilitate updates in the registration of voters who move to another state and to eliminate duplicate registrations, which are a source of potential fraud.
- Voters should be informed of their right to cast a provisional ballot if their name does not appear on the voter roll, or if an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote, but States should take additional and effective steps to inform voters as to the location of their precinct
- The Commission recommends that states use "REAL ID" cards for voting purposes.
- To verify the identity of voters who cast absentee ballots, the voter's signature on the absentee ballot can be matched with a digitized version of the signature that the election administrator maintains. While such signature matches are usually done, they should be done consistently in all cases, so that election officials can verify the identity of every new registrant who casts an absentee ballot.
- Each state needs to audit its voter registration files to determine the extent to which they are accurate (with correct and current information on individuals), complete (including all eligible voters), valid (excluding ineligible voters), and secure (with protections against unauthorized use). This can be done by matching voter files with records in other state agency databases in a regular and timely manner, contacting individuals when the matches are inconclusive, and conducting survey research to estimate the number of voters who believe they are registered but who are not in fact listed in the voter files.
- Each state should oversee political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives to ensure that they operate effectively, that registration forms are delivered promptly to election officials, that all completed registration forms are delivered to the election officials, and that none are "culled" and omitted according to the registrant's partisan affiliation. Measures should also be adopted to track and hold accountable those who are engaged in submitting fraudulent voter registrations. Such oversight might consist of training activists who conduct voter registration drives and tracking voter registration forms to make sure they are all accounted for. In addition, states should apply a criminal penalty to any activist who deliberately fails to deliver a completed voter registration form.

- Investigation and prosecution of election fraud should include those acts committed by individuals, including election officials, poll workers, volunteers, challengers or other nonvoters associated with the administration of elections, and not just fraud by voters.
- In July of even-numbered years, the U.S. Department of Justice should issue a public report on its investigations of election fraud. This report should specify the numbers of allegations made, matters investigated, cases prosecuted, and individuals convicted for various crimes. Each state's attorney general and each local prosecutor should issue a similar report.
- The U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Public Integrity should increase its staff to investigate and prosecute election-related fraud.
- In addition to the penalties set by the Voting Rights Act, it should be a federal felony for any individual, group of individuals, or organization to engage in any act of violence, property destruction (of more than \$500 value), or threatened act of violence that is intended to deny any individual his or her lawful right to vote or to participate in a federal election.
- To deter systemic efforts to deceive or intimidate voters, the Commission recommends federal legislation to prohibit any individual or group from deliberately providing the public with incorrect information about election procedures for the purpose of preventing voters from going to the polls.
- States should define clear procedures for challenges, which should mainly be raised and resolved before the deadline for voter registration. After that, challengers will need to defend their late actions. On Election Day, they should direct their concerns to poll workers, not to voters directly, and should in no way interfere with the smooth operation of the polling station.
- State and local jurisdictions should prohibit a person from handling absentee ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged family member, the U.S. Postal Service or other legitimate shipper, or election officials. The practice in some states of allowing candidates or party workers to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.
- All states should consider passing legislation that attempts to minimize the fraud that has resulted from "payment by the piece" to anyone in exchange for their efforts in voter registration, absentee ballot, or signature collection.
- Nonpartisan structures of election administration are very important, and election administrators should be neutral, professional, and impartial.
- No matter what institutions are responsible for conducting elections, conflict-of-interest standards should be introduced for all federal, state, and local election officials. Election officials should be prohibited by federal and/or state laws from serving on any political campaign committee, making any public comments in support of a candidate, taking a public position on any ballot measure, soliciting campaign funds, or otherwise campaigning for or against a candidate for public office. A decision by a secretary of state to serve as co-chair of his or her party's presidential election committee would clearly violate these standards.

Existing Research Analysis

There are many reports and books that describe anecdotes and draw broad conclusions from a large array of incidents. There is little research that is truly systematic or scientific. The most systematic look at fraud is the report written by Lori Minnite. The most systematic look at voter intimidation is the report by Laughlin McDonald. Books written about this subject seem to all have a political bias and a pre-existing agenda that makes them somewhat less valuable.

Researchers agree that measuring something like the incidence of fraud and intimidation in a scientifically legitimate way is extremely difficult from a methodological perspective and would require resources beyond the means of most social and political scientists. As a result, there is much more written on this topic by advocacy groups than social scientists. It is hoped that this gap will be filled in the "second phase" of this EAC project.

Moreover, reports and books make allegations but, perhaps by their nature, have little follow up. As a result, it is difficult to know when something has remained in the stage of being an allegation and gone no further, or progressed to the point of being investigated or prosecuted or in any other way proven to be valid by an independent, neutral entity. This is true, for example, with respect to allegations of voter intimidation by civil rights organizations, and, with respect to fraud, John Fund's frequently cited book. Again, this is something that it is hoped will be addressed in the "second phase" of this EAC project by doing follow up research on allegations made in reports, books and newspaper articles.

Other items of note:

- There is as much evidence, and as much concern, about structural forms of disenfranchisement as about intentional abuse of the system. These include felon disenfranchisement, poor maintenance of databases and identification requirements.
- There is tremendous disagreement about the extent to which polling place fraud, e.g. double voting, intentional felon voting, noncitizen voting, is a serious problem. On balance, more researchers find it to be less of a problem than is commonly described in the political debate, but some reports say it is a major problem, albeit hard to identify.
- There is substantial concern across the board about absentee balloting and the opportunity it presents for fraud.
- Federal law governing election fraud and intimidation is varied and complex and yet may nonetheless be insufficient or subject to too many limitations to be as effective as it might be.

- Deceptive practices, e.g. targeted flyers and phone calls providing misinformation, were a major problem in 2004.
- Voter intimidation continues to be focused on minority communities, although the American Center for Voting Rights uniquely alleges it is focused on Republicans.

DOJ Public Integrity Reports 2002, 2003, and 2004

General Background

The Public Integrity Reports are submitted to Congress pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which requires the Attorney General to report annually to Congress on the operations and activities of the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section. The Report describes the activities of the Public Integrity Section. It also provides statistics on the nationwide federal effort against public corruption. The Public Integrity Section was created in 1976 in order to consolidate in one unit of the Criminal Division the Department's oversight responsibilities for the prosecution of criminal abuses of the public trust by government officials. Section attorneys prosecute selected cases involving federal, state, or local officials, and also provide advice and assistance to prosecutors and agents in the field regarding the handling of public corruption cases. In addition, the Section serves as the Justice Department's center for handling various issues that arise regarding public corruption statutes and cases. An Election Crimes Branch was created within the Section in 1980 to supervise the Department's nationwide response to election crimes, such as ballot fraud and campaign financing offenses. The Branch reviews all major election crime investigations throughout the country and all proposed criminal charges relating to election crime.

One of the Section's law enforcement priorities is its supervision of the Justice Department's nationwide response to election crimes. The purpose of Headquarters' oversight of election crime matters is to ensure that the Department's nationwide response to election crime is uniform, impartial, and effective. An Election Crimes Branch, headed by a Director and staffed by Section attorneys on a case-by-case basis, was created within the Section in 1980 to handle this supervisory responsibility.

The Election Crimes Branch oversees the Department's handling of all election crime allegations other than those involving civil rights violations, which are supervised by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division. Specifically, the Branch supervises four types of corruption cases: crimes that involve the voting process, crimes involving the financing of federal election campaigns, crimes relating to political shakedowns and other patronage abuses, and illegal lobbying with appropriated funds. Vote frauds and campaign-financing offenses are the most significant and also the most common types of election crimes.

Divisions of the Election Crimes Branch

As affecting the present EAC study, the appropriate divisions of the Election Crimes Branch are:

Vote frauds-During 2002 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and

Wisconsin in handling vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts. This assistance included providing expertise in the evaluation of allegations to determine whether investigation would produce prosecutable federal criminal cases, helping to structure investigations, providing legal assistance with respect to the formulation of charges, and assisting in establishing task force teams of federal and state law enforcement officials to investigate vote fraud matters.

During 2003 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in handling vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts. This assistance included providing expertise in the evaluation of allegations to determine whether investigation would produce prosecutable federal criminal cases, helping to structure investigations, providing legal assistance with respect to the formulation of charges, and assisting in establishing task force teams of federal and state law enforcement officials to investigate vote fraud matters.

During 2004 the Branch assisted United States Attorneys' Offices in the following states in the handling of vote fraud matters that occurred in their respective districts: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. This assistance included evaluating vote fraud allegations to determine whether investigation would produce a prosecutable federal criminal case, helping to structure investigations, providing legal advice concerning the formulation of charges, and assisting in establishing several task force teams of federal and state law enforcement officials to investigate vote fraud matters.

Litigation-The Branch Director or Section attorneys also prosecute selected election crimes, either by assuming total operational responsibility for the case or by handling the case jointly with a United States Attorney's Office. The Section also may be asked to supervise the handling of a case in the event of a partial recusal of the local office. For example, in 2002 the Branch continued to supervise the prosecution of a sheriff and his election attorney for using data from the National Crime Information Center regarding voters' criminal histories to wage an election contest.

District Election Officer Program-The Branch also assists in implementing the Department's long-standing District Election Officer (DEO) Program. This Program is designed to ensure that each of the 93 United States Attorneys' Offices has a trained prosecutor available to oversee the handling of election crime matters within the district and to coordinate district responses with Headquarters regarding these matters. The DEO Program involves the appointment of an Assistant United States Attorney in each federal district to serve a two-year term as a District Election Officer; the training of these

prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of election crimes; and the coordination of election-related initiatives and other law enforcement activities between Headquarters and the field. In addition, the DEO Program is a crucial feature of the Department's nationwide Election Day Program, which occurs in connection with the federal general elections held in November of even-numbered years. The Election Day Program ensures that federal prosecutors and investigators are available both at the Department's Headquarters in Washington and in each district to receive and handle complaints of election irregularities from the public while the polls are open and that the public is aware of how these individuals can be contacted on election day. In 2002 the Department enhanced the DEO Program by establishing a Ballot Integrity Initiative.

Ballot Integrity Initiative-Beginning In September of 2002, the Public Integrity Section, acting at the request of the Attorney General, assisted in the implementation of a Ballot Integrity Initiative for the 2002 general election and subsequent elections. This initiative included increasing the law enforcement priority the Department gives to election crimes; holding a special day-long training event in Washington, DC for representatives of the 93 United States Attorneys' Offices; publicizing the identities and telephone numbers of the DEOs through press releases issued shortly before the November elections; and requiring the 93 U.S. Attorneys to communicate the enhanced federal prioritization of election crime matters to state and local election and law enforcement authorities. As part of Ballot Integrity Initiative, on October 8, 2002, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Rights Section of the Department's Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a Voting Integrity Symposium for District Election Officers representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes used to prosecute such cases. Attorney General John Ashcroft delivered the keynote address on the importance of election crime and ballot integrity enforcement. Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division Ralph Boyd and Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Michael Chertoff also spoke to attendees on the protection of voting rights and the prosecution of election cases.

As part of Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative, on September 23 and 24, 2003, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Rights Section of the Department's Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a two-day Symposium for DEOs representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes used to prosecute such cases. Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division Alexander Acosta and Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Christopher A. Wray delivered the keynote addresses on the importance of protecting voting rights and the prosecution of election cases.

On July 20 and 21, 2004, the Public Integrity Section and the Voting Section of the Department's Civil Rights Division co-sponsored a two-day symposium for DEOs representing each of the 93 federal judicial districts. Topics discussed included the types of conduct that are prosecutable as federal election crimes and the federal statutes available to prosecute such cases, and the handling of civil rights matters involving

voting. Attorney General John Ashcroft delivered the keynote address on the importance of protecting voting rights and the prosecution of election fraud. In addition, Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray of the Criminal Division and Assistant Attorney General R. Alexander Acosta of the Civil Rights Division addressed conference attendees on voting rights and election fraud enforcement issues respectively.

Federal Election Crimes

During 2002 the Public Integrity Section continued its nationwide oversight role regarding the handling of election crime allegations. As part of a general Department effort to increase its effectiveness in this important area, the Section assisted in the planning and execution of the Department's 2002 Ballot Integrity Initiative. The purpose of this ongoing Initiative is to increase the Department's ability to deter, detect, and prosecute election crimes and voting abuses by prioritizing election crime cases. As a result of the Initiative, during 2002 the number of election crime matters opened by federal prosecutors throughout the country increased significantly, as did the Section's active involvement in election crime matters stemming from the Initiative. At the end of 2002, the Section was supervising and providing advice on approximately 43 election crime matters nationwide. In addition, as of December 31, 2002, 11 matters involving possible election crimes were pending in the Section.

During 2002 the Section closed two election crime matters and continued its operational supervision of the following election crime case: *United States v. Woodward and Jordan*, Northern District of Alabama. Jimmy Woodward, the former Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama, and Albert Jordan, an attorney from Birmingham, were indicted in 2000 for conspiring to obtain criminal history records from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) for use in an election contest, for converting NCIC records, and for accessing government computers without authority. The indictment charged that Woodward and Jordan conspired to use Sheriff's office personnel to access NCIC computers to run criminal history checks on hundreds of voters in Jefferson County who had voted by absentee ballot in the 1998 general election, in the hopes they would find criminal histories they could use to challenge the qualifications of voters who cast votes for Woodward's opponent. The charges were dismissed in 2000 on procedural grounds. The Department appealed the dismissal of the charges. In 2001 the case was argued before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by the Appellate Section of the Criminal Division. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court's dismissal of the charges and remanded the case for retrial. The former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama was recused from the case. The case is being prosecuted by an Assistant United States Attorney under the supervision of the Public Integrity Section.

The following cases are the result of an extensive federal investigation into vote-buying in the May 1998 primary election in Knott County, Kentucky, an Appalachian county in the Eastern District of Kentucky. The primary was contested by two slates of candidates. The ballot included the race for the position of Knott County Judge Executive, which controls local government hiring, contracting, and services. The ballot also included a primary contest for the office of United States Senator, conferring federal jurisdiction

over vote buying in the election even though the electoral corruption was directed at local races.

The following cases are being handled jointly by the Section and the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Kentucky:

United States v. Calhoun. On March 28, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Jimmy Calhoun on two counts of vote-buying. On August 19, 2003, Calhoun pled guilty to two counts of vote-buying on behalf of a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome, the successful candidate for County Judge Executive in the May 1998 Knott County, Kentucky primary election. Calhoun paid two persons to vote by absentee ballot. On April 7, 2004, Calhoun was sentenced to six months in prison and two years of supervised release. Calhoun pled guilty to two counts of vote-buying on behalf of a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome, the successful candidate for County Judge Executive in the May 1998 Knott County, Kentucky primary election. Calhoun paid two persons to vote by absentee ballot.

United States v. Conley. On March 28, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Jimmy Lee Conley on five counts of vote-buying and one count of making a false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction. Conley was charged with paying five persons to vote by absentee ballot for a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome, the successful candidate for County Judge Executive. During the investigation, Conley allegedly made false statements to an agent of the FBI. A jury acquitted Conley on June 19, 2003.

United States v. Johnson. On April 24, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Newton Johnson on four counts of vote-buying, one count of making a false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction, and two counts of obstructing justice. On June 2, 2003, Johnson pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of vote-buying, and one count of obstructing justice. Johnson paid four persons to vote by absentee ballot in the May 1998 Knott County, Kentucky primary election. Johnson paid the voters to vote for a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome, the successful candidate for County Judge Executive. During the investigation of this vote-buying, Johnson made a false statement to an agent of the FBI, and pressured grand jury witnesses to falsely deny that he bought their votes. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Johnson pled guilty to paying one of the voters for her vote, and to endeavoring to obstruct the grand jury investigation by urging her to lie under oath. Johnson agreed to cooperate with the government. On October 6, 2003, Johnson was sentenced to three years of probation. Johnson had previously testified at the trial of Donnie Newsome to the nature and extent of the broader conspiracy to approach and pay numerous impoverished, handicapped, illiterate, or otherwise impaired persons to vote for the slate of candidates headed by Newsome. Newsome offered Johnson a road improvement and a county job in exchange for participation in the conspiracy. Johnson, who is impoverished, illiterate, and unable to leave his remote mountain hollow without the road improvement, agreed and purchased the votes of four persons. A jury convicted Newsome on all counts.

United States v. Madden. On March 28, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Patrick Wayne Madden on three counts of vote-buying and one count of making a false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction. On October 6, 2003, Madden pled guilty to one count of vote-buying. Madden paid three persons to vote by absentee ballot for a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome, the successful candidate for County Judge Executive in the May 1998 Knott County, Kentucky primary election. During the investigation of this vote-buying, Madden made a false statement to an agent of the FBI. On February 2, 2004, Madden was sentenced to 20 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Madden pled guilty to one count of vote-buying. Madden paid three persons to vote by absentee ballot for a slate of candidates headed by Newsome.

United States v. Newsome, Pigman, and Smith. On April 24, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted sitting County Judge Executive Donnie Newsome and two of his supporters, Willard Smith and Keith Pigman, on one count of conspiracy to commit vote-buying. The grand jury further charged five substantive counts of vote-buying, one count charging Newsome, two counts charging Smith, one count charging Smith and Pigman, and one count charging all three defendants. Newsome, Pigman, and Smith, working together and with other conspirators, approached and paid numerous impoverished, handicapped, illiterate, or otherwise impaired persons to vote for Newsome by absentee ballot, resulting in a large increase in the rate of absentee voting, and long lines at the County Clerk's Office. Newsome won the election to remain the County Judge Executive.

On July 8, 2003, Pigman pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to commit vote-buying, and one count of vote-buying. Pigman cooperated with the government following his plea, and provided substantial assistance by testifying against Newsome and Smith. Pigman explained the nature and extent of the broader conspiracy to approach and pay numerous impoverished, handicapped, illiterate, or otherwise impaired persons to vote for the slate of candidates headed by Newsome. Pigman further explained that such voters were purposefully chosen because they would present severe credibility problems for the government in any investigation and prosecution of their conspiracy. Newsome offered and ultimately gave Pigman a county job in exchange for Pigman's participation in the conspiracy. On October 30, 2003, Pigman was sentenced to four months of imprisonment, four months of community confinement, and two years of supervised release. On October 1, 2003, a jury convicted both Newsome and Smith on all counts. Newsome, while in office as a Kentucky State Representative, became a candidate for County Judge Executive. Newsome, Pigman, and Smith, working together and with other conspirators, approached and paid numerous persons to vote for Newsome and certain other candidates by absentee ballot, resulting in a large increase in the rate of absentee voting, and long lines at the County Clerk's Office. Newsome, who won the primary election and subsequent elections, was ordered detained pending sentencing, together with Smith, in light of threats to government witnesses during the trial.

On March 16, 2004, Newsome, the former County Judge Executive for Knott County, Kentucky, was sentenced to 26 months in prison, a \$20,000 fine, and three years of supervised release. Smith was sentenced to 24 months in prison, a \$5,000 fine, and three

years of supervised release. A jury previously convicted Newsome and Smith on all counts of an indictment that charged them with conspiracy to buy votes and five counts of vote-buying. Pigman, previously pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, and was sentenced to four months in prison, four months of community service, and two years of supervised release.

United States v. Ronnie Slone and Brady Slone. On March 28, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Ronnie Neal Slone and Brady Warren Slone (who are brothers) on three counts of vote-buying, and on one count each of making a false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction. The Slones allegedly paid three persons to vote by absentee ballot for a slate of candidates headed by Donnie Newsome. During the investigation of this vote-buying, each of the Slones allegedly made a false statement to an agent of the FBI. On August 15, 2003, a jury acquitted both defendants.

United States v. Phillip Slone. On March 28, 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Phillip Slone (who is not directly related to Ronnie and Brady Slone) on seven counts of vote-buying and one count of making a false statement in a matter within federal jurisdiction. On June 4, 2003, Slone pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of vote-buying. Slone paid seven persons to vote for a slate of candidates headed by Homer Sawyer, the unsuccessful incumbent candidate for County Judge Executive in the May 1998 Knott County, Kentucky primary election. During the investigation of this vote-buying, Slone made a false statement to an agent of the FBI. On October 15, 2003, Slone was sentenced to ten months in prison and two years supervised release. Slone appealed his sentence and the district court's jurisdiction, and that appeal is pending.

Democracy At Risk: The November 2004 Election in Ohio
Democratic National Committee

In December 2004, the DNC announced a comprehensive investigative study and analysis of election administration issues arising from the conduct of the 2004 general election in Ohio. The DNC decided to undertake this study because of the many reports, made to the Democratic Party, appearing in the press and made to advocacy groups, immediately after the election, of problems in the administration of the election in that state—problems that prevented many Ohio citizens who showed up at the polls to be able to vote and to have their vote counted. This study was intended to address the legitimate questions and concerns that have been raised and to develop factual information that would be important and useful in crafting further necessary election reforms.

Most Pertinent Findings

- Overall, 28 percent of Ohio voters reported problems with their voting experience, including ballot problems, locating their proper polling place and/or intimidation.
- Twice as many African American voters as white voters reported experiencing problems at the polls (52 percent vs. 25 percent).
- Scarcity of voting machines caused long lines that deterred many people from voting. Three percent of voters who went to the polls left their polling places and did not return due to the long lines.
- Statewide, African American voters reported waiting an average of 52 minutes before voting while white voters reported waiting an average of 18 minutes.
- Overall, 20 percent of white Ohio voters reported waiting more than twenty minutes, while 44 percent of African American voters reported doing so.
- Of provisional voters in Cuyahoga County, 35 percent were African American, compared to 25 percent of non-provisional voters, matched by geography. African American voters were 1.2 times more likely than white voters to be required to vote provisionally.
- Under Ohio law, the only voters who should have been asked for identification were those voting in their first Federal election who had registered by mail but did **not** provide identification in their registration application. Although only 7 percent of all Ohio voters were newly registered (and only a small percentage of those voters registered by mail and failed to provide identification in their registration application), more than one third (37 percent) reported being asked to provide identification.—meaning large numbers of voters were illegally required to produce identification.
- African American voters statewide were 47 percent more likely to be required to show identification than white voters. Indeed, 61 percent of

African American men reported being asked to provide identification at the polls.

- 6 percent of all voters reported feelings of intimidation.
- Statewide, 16 percent of African Americans reported experiencing intimidation versus only 5 percent of white voters.

The report also includes a useful summary and description of the reports that came through Ohio Election Protection on Election Day, which included a wide variety of problems, including voter intimidation and discrimination.

Most Pertinent Recommendations

- States should be encouraged to codify into law all required election practices, including requirements for the adequate training of official poll workers.
- States should adopt uniform and clear published standards for the distribution of voting equipment and the assignment of official pollworkers among precincts, to ensure adequate and nondiscriminatory access. These standards should be based on set ratios of numbers of machines and pollworkers per number of voters expected to turn out, and should be made available for public comment before being adopting.
- States should adopt legislation to make clear and uniform the rules on voter registration.
- States should be urged to implement statewide voter lists in accordance with the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), the election reform law enacted by Congress in 2002 following the Florida debacle.
- State and local jurisdictions should adopt clear and uniform rules on the use of, and the counting of, provisional ballots, and distribute them for public comment well in advance of each election day.
- States should not adopt requirements that voters show identification at the polls, beyond those already required by federal law (requiring that identification be shown only by first time voters who did not show identification when registering.)
- State Attorneys General and local authorities should vigorously enforce, to the full extent permitted by state law, a voter's right to vote without showing identification.
- States should make voter suppression a criminal offense at the state level, in all states.
- States should improve the training of pollworkers.
- States should expend significantly more resources in educating voters on where, when and how to vote.
- Partisan officials who volunteer to work for a candidate should not oversee or administer any elections.

EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

Articles

People for the American Way and the NAACP, "The Long Shadow of Jim Crow," December 6, 2004.

This report describes the pervasive and repeated practices of voter intimidation and vote suppression that have taken place in very recent years and during contemporary American history. It goes on to describe the numerous instances of voter intimidation and suppression during the 2000 election, the 1990s, the 1980s and back through the civil rights movement of the 1960s, putting current efforts in historical perspective.

Describing the chronology of events in this way demonstrates the developing patterns and strategic underpinnings of the tactics used over the last forty years. Examples include:

- Florida law enforcement questioned elderly African American voters in Orlando regarding the 2003 mayoral race, which had already been resolved, shortly before the 2004 election;
- the 2004 Florida felon purge list;
- the case of South Dakota in 2004 in which Native Americans were improperly and illegally required to show photo identification at the polls or denied the right to vote, and similar improper demands for ID from minorities in other parts of the country;
- the use of challengers in minority districts in many locations;
- the challenge to the right of African American students to vote in Texas in 2004;
- the presence of men looking like law enforcement challenging African American voters at the polls in Philadelphia in 2003;
- the distribution of flyers in Louisiana and elsewhere in a number of elections over the last few years in minority areas telling them to vote on the wrong day; and
- the FBI investigation into thousands of Native American voters in South Dakota in 2002.

Laughlin McDonald, "The New Poll Tax," *The American Prospect* vol. 13 no. 23, December 30, 2002.

Argues that "the discriminatory use of so-called 'ballot security' programs" has been a reoccurring scandal since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These programs are deceptively presented as preventing voter fraud and thereby furthering good government. However, McDonald states "but far too often they [the ballot security programs] are actually designed to suppress minority voting -- and for nakedly partisan purposes." Blames the federal government as well as the states for use of suspect ballot security programs. McDonald cites several ballot security efforts that were really disguised attempts at minority voter suppression:

- SD-DOJ "voting integrity initiative".
- AR - poll watchers driving away voters in predominantly black precincts by taking photos of them and demanding identification during pre-election day balloting.
- MI - "spotters" at heavily Democratic precincts was an effort to intimidate black voters and suppress Democratic turnout
- SC - one county's officials instituted a new and unauthorized policy allowing them to challenge voters who gave rural route or box numbers for their registration address (disproportionately affecting African Americans).
- the 1981 gubernatorial election anti-fraud initiative leading to the well known consent decree prohibiting the Republicans from repeating this, a similar Republican effort in Louisiana in 1986 in Senator John Breaux's race which again resulted in prohibition by a state court judge, and a similar effort by Republicans in Senator Jesse Helms 1990 reelection.

States that HAVA "contains provisions that may enhance the opportunities for harassment and intimidation of minorities through ballot-security

EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

programs (especially voter ID). Indicates that the crux of the problem is **lax enforcement of federal voters rights laws** ("there is no record of the purveyors of any ballot-security program being criminally prosecuted by federal authorities for interfering with the right to vote." The only positive case law McDonald cited was a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that affirmed "an award of damages ranging from \$500 to \$2,000, payable by individual poll officials to each of seven black voters who had been unlawfully challenged, harassed, denied assistance in voting or purged from the rolls in the town of Crawfordsville [Arkansas].")
Recommends that Congress and the states should adopt "nondiscriminatory, evenly applied measures to ensure the integrity of the ballot."

Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, "An Evaluation: Voter Registration Elections Board" Report 05-12, September, 2005.

Current voter registration practices were determined to be insufficient to ensure the accuracy of voter registration lists used by poll workers or to prevent ineligible persons from registering to vote. **In six municipalities where sufficient information was available, there was 105 instances of potentially improper or fraudulent voting in the 2004 elections. These included: 98 ineligible felons who may have voted; 2 individuals who may have voted twice; 1 voter who may have been underage; and 4 absentee ballots that should not have been counted because the voters who cast them died before Election Day** (all but dead voters were forwarded to appropriate district attorneys for investigation). Statutes require that clerks send cards to everyone who registers by mail or on Election Day. However, only 42.7 % of the 150 municipalities surveyed sent cards to both groups, and 46 % did not send any address verification cards to those registering to vote on Election Day in November 2004. Statutes also require clerks to provide the local district attorney with the names of any Election Day registrants whose cards are undeliverable at the address provided. However, only 24.3 % of the clerks who sent cards also forwarded names from undeliverable cards to district attorneys. District attorneys surveyed indicated that they require more information than is typically provided to conduct effective investigations. To ensure that voter registration lists contain only the names of qualified electors, municipal clerks are required by statute to remove or inactivate the names of individuals who have not voted in four years, to update registration information for individuals who move or change their names, and to remove or inactivate the names of deceased individuals. They are also required to notify registered voters before removing their names from registration lists. These statutory requirements are not consistently followed:

- 85.3 % of municipalities removed the names of inactive voters from their voter registration lists;
- 71.4 % sometimes or always notified registered voters before removing their names; and
- 54.0 % reported removing the names of ineligible felons.
- registration lists contain duplicate records and the names of ineligible individuals (e.g.; more than 348,000 electronic voter registration records from eight municipalities were reviewed, identifying 3,116 records that appear to show individuals who are registered more than once in the same municipality).

Recommendations:

- adjust the early registration deadline to provide clerks more time to prepare registration lists;
- establish more stringent requirements for special registration deputies, including prohibiting compensation based on the number of individuals registered;
- establish uniform requirements for demonstrating proof of residence for all registrants;
- provide municipal clerks with more flexibility in the use of address verification cards;
- Authorize civil penalties for local election officials and municipalities that fail to comply with election laws; and
- implement mandatory elections training requirements for municipal clerks.

Report also recognized that the new **HAVA registration procedures would help with existing registration problems.**

EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Attorney's Office "Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election Fraud," May 10, 2005.

On January 26, 2005, the Milwaukee Police Department, Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorney's Office formed a task force to investigate alleged voting irregularities during the November 2004 elections. The task force has made the following specific determinations based on evidence examined to date:

- **evidence of more than 100 individual instances of suspected double-voting, voting in names of persons who likely did not vote, and/or voting in names believed to be fake.**
- **more than 200 felons voted when they were not eligible to do so. (In order to establish criminal cases, the government must establish willful violations in individual instances);**
- **persons who had been paid to register voters as "deputy registrars" falsely listed approximately 65 names in order to receive compensation for the registrations. (The evidence does not indicate that these particular false registrations were later used to cast votes); and,**
- **the number of votes counted from the City of Milwaukee exceeds the number of persons recorded as voting by more than 4,500. (Evidence indicates widespread record keeping errors with respect to recording the number of voters)**

The investigation concentrated on the 70,000+ same-day registrations. It found that a large majority of the reported errors were the result of data entry errors, such as street address numbers being transposed. However, the investigation also found more than 100 instances where votes were cast in a manner suggesting fraud. These include:

- persons with the same name and date of birth recorded as voting more than once;
- persons who live outside Milwaukee, but who used non-existent City addresses to register and vote in the City (141 of them were same day registrants; in several instances, the voter explicitly listed municipality names other than Milwaukee on the registration cards);
- persons who registered and voted with identities and addresses that cannot in any way be linked to a real person;
- persons listed as voting under a name and identity of a person known to be deceased;
- persons whose identities were used to vote, but who in subsequent interviews told task force investigators that they did not, in fact, vote in the City of Milwaukee.

Investigation also found:

- **persons who were paid money to obtain registrations allegedly falsified approximately 65 names on registration forms, allegedly to obtain more money for each name submitted.**
- **more than 200 felons who were not eligible to vote in the 2004 election, but who are recorded as having done so.**
- **same-day registrations were accepted in which the card had incomplete information that would help establish identity. For example: 48 original cards for persons listed as voting had no name; 548 had no address; 28 did not have signatures; and another 23 cards had illegible information (part of approximately 1,300 same-day registrations for which votes were cast, but which election officials could not authenticate as proper voters within the City).**
- **the post-election misfiling or loss of original green registration cards that were considered duplicates, but that in fact corresponded to additional votes. These cards were used to record votes, but approximately 100 cards of interest to investigators can no longer be located. In addition, other original green registration cards continue to be found.**

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EAC SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW FOR VOTING FRAUD-VOTER INTIMIDATION RESEARCH

National Commission on Federal Election Reform, "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections," Center for Democracy and Election Management, American University, September 2005.

Among the observations made that are relevant to the EAC study of fraud and intimidation are the following:

- The November 2004 elections showed that irregularities and fraud still occur.
- Failure to provide voters with such basic information as their registration status and their polling site location raises a barrier to voting as significant as inconsistent procedures on provisional ballots or voter ID requirements.
- **There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.**
- The Commission is concerned that the different approaches to identification cards might prove to be a serious impediment to voting.
- **Voter registration lists are often inflated by the inclusion of citizens who have moved out of state but remain on the lists.** Moreover, under the National Voter Registration Act, names are often added to the list, but counties and municipalities often do not delete the names of those who moved. Inflated voter lists are also caused by phony registrations and efforts to register individuals who are ineligible. At the same time, inaccurate purges of voter lists have removed citizens who are eligible and are properly registered.
- Political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives generally contribute to the electoral process by generating interest in upcoming elections and expanding participation. However, they are occasionally abused. **There were reports in 2004 that some party activists failed to deliver voter registration forms of citizens who expressed a preference for the opposing party.**
- **Vote by mail raises concerns about privacy**, as citizens voting at home may come under pressure to vote for certain candidates, and it increases the risk of fraud.
- **While election fraud is difficult to measure, it occurs.** The U.S. Department of Justice has launched more than 180 investigations into election fraud since October 2002. These investigations have resulted in **charges for multiple voting, providing false information on their felon status, and other offenses** against 89 individuals and in convictions of 52 individuals. The convictions related to a **variety of election fraud offenses, from vote buying to submitting false voter registration information and voting-related offenses by non-citizens.** In addition to the federal investigations, state attorneys general and local prosecutors handle cases of election fraud. **Other cases are never pursued because of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence for prosecution or because of the low priority given to election fraud cases.**
- **Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud**
- **Non-citizens have registered to vote in several recent elections**
- **The growth of "third-party" (unofficial) voter registration drives in recent elections has led to a rise in reports of voter registration fraud.**
- **Many states allow the representatives of candidates or political parties to challenge a person's eligibility to register or vote or to challenge an inaccurate name on a voter roll. This practice of challenges may contribute to ballot integrity, but it can have the effect of intimidating eligible voters, preventing them from casting their ballot, or otherwise disrupting the voting process.**

Its pertinent recommendations for reform are as follows:

- **Interoperable state voter databases** are needed to facilitate updates in the registration of voters who move to another state and to eliminate duplicate registrations, which are a source of potential fraud.
- **Voters should be informed of their right to cast a provisional ballot** if their name does not appear on the voter roll, or if an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote, but **States should take additional and effective steps to inform voters as to the location of their precinct**
- The Commission recommends that states use **"REAL ID" cards for voting purposes.**
- **To verify the identity of voters who cast absentee ballots, the voter's signature on the absentee ballot can be matched with a digitized**

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version of the signature that the election administrator maintains. While such signature matches are usually done, they should be done consistently in all cases, so that election officials can verify the identity of every new registrant who casts an absentee ballot.

- **Each state needs to audit its voter registration files** to determine the extent to which they are accurate (with correct and current information on individuals), complete (including all eligible voters), valid (excluding ineligible voters), and secure (with protections against unauthorized use). This can be done by matching voter files with records in other state agency databases in a regular and timely manner, contacting individuals when the matches are inconclusive, and conducting survey research to estimate the number of voters who believe they are registered but who are not in fact listed in the voter files.
- **Each state should oversee political party and nonpartisan voter registration drives** to ensure that they operate effectively, that registration forms are delivered promptly to election officials, that all completed registration forms are delivered to the election officials, and that none are "culled" and omitted according to the registrant's partisan affiliation. Measures should also be adopted to track and hold accountable those who are engaged in submitting fraudulent voter registrations. Such oversight might consist of training activists who conduct voter registration drives and tracking voter registration forms to make sure they are all accounted for. In addition, states should apply a criminal penalty to any activist who deliberately fails to deliver a completed voter registration form.
- **Investigation and prosecution of election fraud should include those acts committed by individuals, including election officials, poll workers, volunteers, challengers or other nonvoters associated with the administration of elections, and not just fraud by voters.**
- **In July of even-numbered years, the U.S. Department of Justice should issue a public report on its investigations of election fraud.** This report should specify the numbers of allegations made, matters investigated, cases prosecuted, and individuals convicted for various crimes. **Each state's attorney general and each local prosecutor should issue a similar report.**
- **The U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Public Integrity should increase its staff to investigate and prosecute election-related fraud.**
- **In addition to the penalties set by the Voting Rights Act, it should be a federal felony for any individual, group of individuals, or organization to engage in any act of violence, property destruction (of more than \$500 value), or threatened act of violence that is intended to deny any individual his or her lawful right to vote or to participate in a federal election.**
- **To deter systemic efforts to deceive or intimidate voters, the Commission recommends federal legislation to prohibit any individual or group from deliberately providing the public with incorrect information about election procedures for the purpose of preventing voters from going to the polls.**
- **States should define clear procedures for challenges, which should mainly be raised and resolved before the deadline for voter registration.** After that, challengers will need to defend their late actions. **On Election Day, they should direct their concerns to poll workers, not to voters directly, and should in no way interfere with the smooth operation of the polling station.**
- **State and local jurisdictions should prohibit a person from handling absentee ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged family member, the U.S. Postal Service or other legitimate shipper, or election officials.** The practice in some states of allowing candidates or party workers to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.
- **All states should consider passing legislation that attempts to minimize the fraud that has resulted from "payment by the piece" to anyone in exchange for their efforts in voter registration, absentee ballot, or signature collection.**
- **Nonpartisan structures of election administration are very important, and election administrators should be neutral, professional, and impartial.**
- **No matter what institutions are responsible for conducting elections, conflict-of-interest standards should be introduced for all federal, state, and local election officials.** Election officials should be prohibited by federal and/or state laws from serving on any political campaign committee, making any public comments in support of a candidate, taking a public position on any ballot measure, soliciting campaign funds, or otherwise campaigning for or against a candidate for public office. A decision by a secretary of state to serve as co-chair of his or her party's presidential

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election committee would clearly violate these standards.

The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and Spencer Overton, Commissioner and Law Professor at George Washington University School of Law "Response to the Report of the 2005 Commission on Federal Election Reform," September 19, 2005.

Recommendation on Voter Identification -

- Report premises its burdensome identification proposals on the need to ensure ballot integrity and on the existence of or potential for widespread fraud. However, the **Report admits that there is simply "no evidence" that the type of fraud that could be solved by stricter voter identification** – individual voters who misrepresent their identity at the polls – is a widespread problem.
- The photo ID proposal guards against only one type of fraud: individuals arriving at the polls to vote using false information, such as the name of another registered voter, or a recent but not current address. Since the costs of this form of fraud are extremely high (federal law provides for up to five years' imprisonment), and the benefits to any individual voter are extremely low, it is highly unlikely that this will ever occur with any frequency. **The limited types of fraud that could be prevented by a Real ID requirement are extremely rare and difficult.**
- In the most comprehensive survey of alleged election fraud to date, Professor Loraine Minnite and David Callahan have shown that the **incidence of individual voter fraud at the polls is negligible**. A few prominent examples support their findings. In Ohio, a statewide survey found four instances of ineligible persons voting or attempting to vote in 2002 and 2004, out of 9,078,728 votes cast – a rate of 0.00004%. Earlier this year, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox stated that she could not recall one documented case of voter fraud relating to the impersonation of a registered voter at the polls during her ten-year tenure as Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State.
- The Report attempts to support its burdensome identification requirements on four specific examples of purported fraud or potential fraud. **None of the Report's cited examples of fraud stand up under closer scrutiny.** This response report goes through each instance of fraud raised by the Commission report and demonstrates that in each case the allegation in fact turned out later not to be true or the fraud cited was not of the type that would be addressed by a photo identification requirement.
- The Report fails to provide a good reason to create greater hurdles for voters who vote at the polls than for those who vote absentee. Despite the fact that **absentee ballots are more susceptible to fraud than regular ballots**, the Report exempts absentee voters from its proposed Real ID and proof of citizenship requirements.

Other points in ID requirement:

- **Report does not explain why the goals of improved election integrity will not be met through the existing provisions in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).**
- Report fails to consider alternative measures to advance its goals that are less restrictive to voters. To the extent that any limited fraud **by individuals at the polls does trickle into the system, it can be addressed by far less restrictive alternatives.** The first step is to recognize that only voters who appear on the registration list may vote a regular ballot. Proper cleaning of registration lists – and proper use of the lists at the poll–will therefore go a long way toward ensuring that every single ballot is cast by an eligible voter.
- In addition to the **better registration lists that full implementation will provide, better record keeping and administration at the polls will reduce the limited potential for voting by ineligible persons.** In the unlikely event that implementation of current law is not able to wipe out whatever potential for individual fraud remains, there are several effective and less burdensome alternatives to the Report's Real ID recommendation that received wholly insufficient consideration.
- Costs - If required as a precondition for voting, photo identification would operate as a de facto poll tax that could disenfranchise low-income voters. To alleviate this burden, the Report appropriately recommends that the "Real ID" card itself be issued free of charge. Nevertheless, the